Disarmament Scenarios
- Introduction
- Case Against Nuclear Weapons
- Global Scenarios
- Steps to Abolition
- Ending Extended
Nuclear Deterrence - No First Use
- De-alerting
- Deep Cuts
- Dismantlement
- Banning Nukes
- Other
- Geographic
- United States/Russia
- United Kingdom/France
- China
- India/Pakistan
- Israel
Disarmament Scenarios
Steps toward Abolition: De-alerting
INDEX
Commission Recommendations on De-alerting
“De-alerting Strategic Forces” by Bruce G. Blair
“Reframing Nuclear De-Alert”, a report from the EastWest Institute
“De-alerting: Beyond Deterrence” Howard W. Hallman
Bibliography
We invite other articles on de-alerting. We are especially interested in scenarios that offer a multi-nation, step-by-step approach which assures security for all parties at all times. You may submit your article to hwhallman [at] zero-nukes.org as a Word attachment.
You may make short comments on the articles in this section on our Blog.
Introduction
For the last 20 years there has been considerable discussion about taking long-range nuclear weapons off high alert. This is variously referred to as de-alerting, standing down, or decreasing the operational readiness of nuclear arsenals.
Past Proposals
As the Cold War drew to a close in the latter part of the 1980s and ended in December 1991 when the Soviet Union dissolved, some persons began to question why the United States and the Soviet Union (succeeded by Russia) should continue to retain a large number of nuclear-armed missiles aimed at each other on high alert. This led to proposals for de-alerting or standing down the respective nuclear arsenals.
Emphasis was upon taking nuclear weapons off high-alert in order to reduce the risk of accidental use and to provide more time for decision-makers to consider whether to use nuclear weapons in crisis situations. Our Archives contains recommendations from military leaders, civic sector advocates, commissions, and religious organizations in that period.
During the 2000 presidential election campaign George W. Bush stated that “the United States should remove as many weapons as possible from high-alert, hair-trigger status - another unnecessary vestige of Cold War confrontation.” The 2000 Republican Party Platform endorsed this position.
Encouraged by this possibility, civic sector organizations formed the Back from the Brink Campaign to build public support for de-alerting the nuclear arsenal. However, President Bush and his administration turned away from the idea of de-alerting. Although advocates continued to study how de-alerting could occur, it receded as a public issue in the United States.
Obama Administration
The issue came up during the 2008 presidential election campaign when Barak Obama pledged that as president he would “work with Russia to take nuclear weapons off hair-trigger alert.” The 2008 Democratic Party Platform in a section on “End Cold War Nuclear Postures” echoed this language. After Obama became president the White House website carried this message: “As president, Obama will work with Russia to find common ground and bring significantly more weapons off hair-trigger alert.” However, after several months this statement was removed.
When President Obama in a speech in Prague on April 9, 2009 on “America's commitment to seek the peace and security of a world without nuclear weapons”, he did not include de-alerting as one of the steps toward this objective. His September address to the United Nations General Assembly included discussion of nuclear issues without mentioning de-alerting. Behind the scenes, according to Hans M. Kristensen of the Federation of American Scientists, the Obama Administration asked four countries to postpone a resolution at the United Nations calling for reducing the alert-level of nuclear weapons. The UN General Assembly had previously adopted a similar resolution in December 2008 with the United States, United Kingdom, and France voting no and Russia abstaining.
A blog message from Center for Strategic and International Studies speculates that President Obama isn’t pressing for de-alerting because he wants to focus his attention on three primary nuclear weapons issues: getting a new START agreement with Russia and ratification by the U.S. Senate, Senate ratification of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, and negotiations on a Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty. Each of these has strong opposing forces in the United States which are likely also to be against de-alerting. Some persons believe that Obama will take up de-alerting as a follow-on to the new START agreement.
If this is true, it is a matter of timing and the necessity for advocates of de-alerting to build public support.
Resources
There is a rich literature on de-alerting. Our Archives provides linkage to statements and reports written prior to 2005. Here we offer the following:
- Reference to recommendations on de-alerting by a variety of organizations
- A summary of “Findings and Recommendations” on De-alerting Strategic Forces by Bruce G. Blair, the world’s foremost authority on this subject. This comes from a chapter of Reykjavik Revisited, a report from an October conference at the Hoover Institution, convened by George P. Shultz. Blair believes that de-alerting can facilitate “real progress toward the global elimination of nuclear weapons…while preserving stable deterrence during a transition to a nuclear-free world.”
- Proceedings from a June 2009 seminar on “Reframing Nuclear De-Alert” sponsored by the EastWest Institute. The report assumes that some form of nuclear deterrence will continue and that de-alerting would enhance safety.
- An article by Howard W. Hallman that considers nuclear deterrence an obsolete doctrine for the 21st century and that de-alerting can serve as a step forward beyond deterrence toward a world free of nuclear weapons.
- A bibliography of online writings on de-alerting.
