Disarmament Scenarios

Disarmament Scenarios

Steps toward Abolition:
Ending Extended Nuclear Deterrence

Extended Deterrence on the Way
to a Nuclear-Free World

by George Perkovich

This is an abstract of a research paper commissioned by the International Commission on Non-proliferation and Disarmament. We are particularly interested in Perkovich’s analysis of threats to U.S. allies and their relationship to the nuclear component of extended deterrence. The entire paper with an executive summary is available online.

ABSTRACT

In this research paper George Perkovich indicates:

As long as the U.S. has nuclear weapons and alliance commitments, the U.S. deterrent will inherently have a nuclear component. On the other hand, a willingness to eliminate nuclear weapons could help reduce the threats that motivate extended nuclear deterrence in the first place.

He states:

In a world where the U.S. and others have nuclear weapons, the central questions are: what are the threats that the U.S. and its allies must deter, and how should they deter them?

The answers to these questions suggest that the nuclear component of extended deterrence is exaggerated today in ways that obscure the more pressing questions and challenges of building security in Eurasia and East Asia.

This does not mean that the need to help allies deter adversaries has disappeared. It merely means that the role of nuclear weapons in extended deterrence has shrunk much more radically than many people assume. The need to address the central questions co-operatively with key allies cannot be over-emphasized.

Threats

The declining role of nuclear weapons is revealed in Perkovich’s review of threats in “two regions where the U.S. has formal alliance commitments to extended deterrence, including nuclear deterrence: NATO Europe, and Japan, South Korea, Australia (and perhaps Taiwan) in East Asia.”

He writes, “In Europe, NATO states do not threaten each other. To the extent that the original members of NATO face ‘hard’ security threats on their territories, terrorism is the most feasible form.” But NATO-based nuclear weapons are irrelevant to deter or defeat terrorism. Nor would long-range ballistic missiles be useful against uncertain targets.

He continues, “Nuclear weapons are the only way Russia could threaten Western European territory, given the state of Russian conventional forces. Yet, there is no reason to think Russia would be interested in waging this kind of war against Western Europe, given the legacies of World War I and II, the superiority of NATO conventional capabilities, and Russian dependence on revenues from gas sales to Europe.”

As to former Warsaw Pact and Soviet states now in NATO, they are more exposed to Russian coercion. But after analyzing several situations, Perkovich concludes, “This challenge has little to do with extended nuclear deterrence. Given political realities in NATO societies, it is extremely difficult to envision consensus on running risks of nuclear war over conflicts of this sort.”

In East Asia, Perkovich indicates, “North Korea poses nuclear threats to South Korea and Japan….While retaining nuclear deterrence, allies should realistically examine whether nuclear weapons are necessary or would be feasibly used to destroy the North Korean government and Army.” He notes that nuclear attack would harm large number of North Korean civilians and fallout would affect South Korea, too.

Even though China is “steadily building up its armed forces”, Perkovich feels that it is unrealistic “to envision Chinese military aggression against the Japanese mainland or Japanese naval forces”. Rather China and Japan are in economic competition in which extended nuclear deterrence is irrelevant.

Turning to the Middle East, he says, “I believe that discussing extending nuclear deterrence to Iran’s neighbors now is both premature and counterproductive. Conventional deterrence and missile defenses should be emphasized instead.”

No First-Use

On a related matter, George Perkovich writes:

An over-arching issue in each region is that of first-use and its relation to deterrence. In each of the regions, the sources of likely threat do not enjoy conventional (or CBW) superiority of the U.S. First use therefore is realistically germane only to deter nuclear threats. But breaking the taboo against using nuclear weapons could cause a major political and moral backlash that would undermine the strategic position of the U.S., including within allied societies. Using nuclear weapons in retaliation would be much more credible – though the U.S. would still need to consider whether it would be necessary or wise to do so.

History’s Lesson

Perkovich reviews the 60+ year history of extended nuclear deterrence and concludes that there has always been tension been “fear of abandonment” and “fear of entrapment”. Allies wonder, “will the U.S. be willing to risk war, including nuclear war against U.S. forces or homeland, in order to defend its allies?” They worry “that the US will get in fight with another state, and the allies will get caught in the middle.”

From the U.S. perspective, “Americans can worry that an ally might provoke a conflict with another state, or not try hard enough to avoid one, and the US would be trapped in a no-win position or looking like it is abandoning an ally or joining a fight it considers to be unnecessary.”

Looking at actual experience, according to Perkovich, reveals that U.S. presidents have decided not to use nuclear weapons in crises situations that were going bad for the United States and its allies. This includes the stalemated Korean War, when French were facing defeat in Vietnam in 1954, and the Vietnam War that the U.S. was losing.

This leads Perkovich to conclude:

The underlying difficulty is that nuclear weapons are, or are perceived to be, inherently weapons of indiscriminate and disproportionate destruction. They are self-deterring for actors who depend upon public support from their own populations, their allies, and broader international society.

The reality today is that the taboo against using nuclear weapons has become so strong, especially in democracies, that the only threat against which it is justifiable and therefore credible to use these weapons is one where the survival of the U.S. or an ally is clearly jeopardized. Yet, with the possible exception of North Korea whose leadership could be imagined to use nuclear weapons against Japan or South Korea if its own survival were threatened, no other state posses a realistic threat to the national survival of U.S. allies in Europe or East Asia.

Russia does not have the intention or capability to sustain an invasion of the new NATO states, let alone threaten their survival….China has no interest and inadequate capabilities to take mainland Japanese territory or otherwise threaten it militarily….For the foreseeable future China would be highly unlikely to use nuclear weapons on Taiwanese targets, as the Chinese goal is to integrate Taiwanese into China, not to kill them.”

The Way Forward

In looking at the future of extended nuclear deterrence, Perkovich makes these points:

  1. Do not overestimate the extended deterrent utility of nuclear weapons.
  2. For credible deterrence, focus on non-nuclear capabilities.
  3. In each region the U.S. and its allies should concentrate on building cooperation and confidence in overall political-security strategies.
  4. The United States and all of the allies to whom it extends nuclear deterrence have obligations under the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty to support the total elimination of all nuclear arsenals.