Disarmament Scenarios

No First Use

Non-First Use as a Way of Outlawing Nuclear Weapons

by Alexei Arbatov
Moscow Center, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace

In a research paper for the International Commission on Nuclear Non-proliferation and Disarmament, Alexei Arbatov provides an excellent analysis of issues arising from proposals for no first use of nuclear weapons. He believes that “The renewed momentum given to nuclear disarmament in recent years makes it timely once again to consider NFU [non-first use].”

ABSTRACT

This abstract contain quotations from the Executive Summary in Dr. Arbatov’s paper.

Although the NPT [Non-Proliferation Treaty] contains some provisions relevant to the outlawing of nuclear weapons, it does not contain a formal pledge not to use them, and the concept of nuclear deterrence continues to exist.
As long as nuclear weapons exist, outlawing them may only be conceived of in the context of the adoption of all nuclear powers as a non-first use (NFU) pledge.

To date there has been no unequivocal or verifiable NFU pledge by the nuclear armed powers.
The nuclear “haves” appear willing to cling to nuclear deterrence, not because of the difficulties of disarmament, but because of the inherent advantages they see in nuclear weapons.

None of the NWS [nuclear weapons states] have credible concerns about massive conventional attack by the other NWS which would merit a nuclear response, apart from Russia which continues to harbor serious security concerns about NATO expansion.
A nuclear response by any nuclear armed state to a WMD [weapons of mass destruction including chemical and biological] attack is unlikely, especially given that such an attack would most likely come from terrorists.

Tactical nuclear weapons stationed on foreign territory pose their own problems, but these could be resolved by bilateral US/Russian agreement to withdraw the weapons from active deployment.
US ballistic missile defense [BMD] programs, despite US claim to the contrary, are regarded as major provocations by Russia and China, and will need credible limitations imposed on them.

Dealing with the NFU issue seriously implies matching it to real strategic concepts, operational plans and forces, and perhaps dealing with NFU with a range of options.