Disarmament Scenarios

No First Use

Reflections on No First Use of Nuclear Weapons

by Howard W. Hallman
Methodists United for Peace with Justice

For many years I was skeptical of no first use proposals for two reasons. First, they still left in place the nuclear deterrence doctrine. Second, there remained the possibility of nuclear retaliatory responses. Both practices I consider immoral.

In working on material for this website I have taken a second look at no first use. Now I have a more nuanced view. I can see no first use as a constructive step toward a world without nuclear weapons. At best it should occur as part of a planned sequence in a course to global elimination that is balanced and provides undiminished security for all parties at all stages of reduction.

Two of the articles referenced on this website have this perspective: by Alexei Arbatov and Hui Zhang. Joseph Rotblat also saw it this way. It is the long-run orientation of Pugwash, though in the Pugwash workshop reported here discussion tended to go not much farther than eliminating the dangers of first use while retaining deterrence capability. But the report noted that this could lead to smaller nuclear forces, no nukes for quick-launch counterforce to destroy other nations’ nuclear arsenals, no tactical nukes for battlefield use, no bunker busters to attack underground facilities.

Scott Sagan in making the case for no first use seems to be committed to retaining nuclear deterrence and its corollary, extended nuclear deterrence. He would make it safer by having the United States lead the way with a declaratory policy of no first use that would rule out the use of nuclear weapons in response to conventional, chemical, or biological attacks. But a nuclear arsenal would remain in place to deter other nuclear weapons, extend a nuclear umbrella over allies, and in a worst case scenario respond to nuclear attack.

This isn’t good enough. As I have written elsewhere, ultimately nuclear weapons are useless for any legitimate military purpose and for dealing with terrorists. They are cold war holdovers that the five original nuclear weapons states are stuck with. Ultimately they provide more peril than security for India, Pakistan, Israel, and the wannabes. The peoples of these nations are challenged to find ways to get rid of them.

For this purpose a no first use policy can be a helpful step toward getting rid of all nuclear weapons. This could get started with a declaratory statement by the United States that it will not make first use of nuclear weapons under any circumstance, whether it be in response to conventional, chemical, or nuclear attack or as preemption to destroy enemy facilities. But this wouldn’t rule out response with conventional weapons. Elaboration of this statement can explain that it encompasses negative security assurance to all non-nuclear weapon states that the United States will not use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against them.

A U.S. no first use policy could apply to its security commitments to allies so that extended nuclear deterrence would represent willingness to consider responding with nuclear weapons only to nuclear attack, not conventional, chemical, or biological attack. (As I state elsewhere, I would prefer to ending extended nuclear deterrence altogether.)

The United States could ask all other possessors of nuclear weapons to make a similar no first use pledge. This should not occur in a vacuum. Rather this would need to occur, as Alexeis Arbatov indicates, in the context of dealing with strategic concepts and with operational plans and forces. As the Pugwash workshop suggested, it could lead to the demobilization of counterforce weapons and elimination of tactical nukes. De-alerting can be the leading edge of applying the no first use policy by removing nuclear weapons from quick-launch alert.

One might ask, what if some nuclear powers refuse to adopt a no first use policy? This wouldn’t matter because the U.S. retaliatory nuclear arsenal would still be in place. According to traditional nuclear deterrence doctrine, this is sufficient to prevent a first use attack against the United States. Furthermore, as I write in an article on extended deterrence, the United States and its treaty allies currently face no realistic threats that might require a nuclear response. Nuclear weapons are useless against terrorists. States with nuclear ambitions, such as North Korea and Iran, can be dealt with by other means.

Rather than the United States acting alone, it would be preferable for all nuclear weapons states to adopt a no first use policy. This could take the form of a treaty, or at least a joint statement, that would be part of the superstructure that provides the framework for global elimination of nuclear weapons. As indicated elsewhere, “getting rid of nuclear weapons is that it is within the mutual interest of all the possessors.” No first use is a proper step in that direction.

In the broad scenario a no first use declaration or treaty can be followed by de-alerting, which some refer to as “decreasing the operational readiness of nuclear arsenals”. At the same time deep cuts can occur in nuclear arsenals: eliminating tactical (battlefield) nukes and staged reduction of strategic (long range) nukes with proper verification. This would be followed by dismantlement. These steps can occur through reciprocal executive decisions, bilateral agreements, and multilateral treaties, possibly leading to a universal nuclear weapons convention that bans nuclear weapons and provides for final elimination. Parallel and intertwined should be measures of nuclear non-proliferation that prevent new nations from acquiring nuclear weapons.

It is in this sense that a no first use policy can make a useful contribution. This a more worthy pursuit than merely making nuclear deterrence safer but retaining threat of nuclear attack for the foreseeable feature.