Disarmament Scenarios

No First Use

The Case for No First Use

by Scott D. Sagan
Center for International Security and Cooperation
Stanford University

Scott Sagan’s article on “The Case for No First Use” appeared in Survival, vol. 51, no. 3, June-July 2009 (pp.163-182). A subsequent issue carried a follow-up exchange by four experts and Dr. Sagan’s rebuttal.

ABSTRACT

Scott Sagan considers the extent to which the United States still needs to use the threat of first use of nuclear weapons to deter chemical and biological weapons and large-scale conventional military force. He concludes:

Examination of the costs and benefits suggests that the United States should, after appropriate consultation with allies, move toward adopting a nuclear-weapons no-first-use declaratory policy by stating that “the role of US nuclear weapons is to deter nuclear weapons use by other nuclear-weapons states against the United States, our allies, and our armed forces, and to be able [to] respond, with appropriate range of nuclear retaliation options, if necessary, in the event that deterrence fails.”

That rules out use of nuclear weapons in response to chemical, biological, and conventional attack.

In relating no first use to “deterrence, reassurance, and the ‘nuclear umbrella’,” Sagan indicates:

Given the current superiority of the United States in conventional military force, there are few credible scenarios in which America and its allies would face defeat in a major conventional war. The maintenance of US nuclear ‘extended deterrence’ commitments to key allies who face nuclear neighbours, however, remains both a central security interest for the United States and an essential non-proliferation tool.

Sagan believes that “extended nuclear deterrence can be made compatible with a no-first-use doctrine if changes in US nuclear security guarantees were made to fit current conditions of US conventional military superiority.” The change would emphasize “conventional responses to conventional attacks and nuclear retaliation only in the event of a nuclear attack.”

(For more on extended deterrence, go to another section of this website where we offer our view that it is time to phase out extended nuclear deterrence.)

Sagan discusses calculated ambiguity practiced by the Clinton and G.W. Bush administrations to indicate that nuclear weapons might be used to deter chemical or biological use by other states. He observes that “such threats do not just signal commitment, they create commitment.” This happens because if deterrence fails, there will be pressure to use nuclear weapons to maintain reputation for honoring commitments. The result is increased “likelihood that that the United States will use nuclear weapons first in response to a perceived imminent of actual chemical or biological attack.” An unambiguous no first use declaratory policy would reduce this risk.

Sagan notes that in dealing with states that support terrorists and states that appear to be developing nuclear weapons, sometimes U.S. officials have stated that “all options are on the table.” This implies a willingness to initiate use of nuclear weapons. He believes that this is counterproductive because it encourages these states to develop their own nuclear weapons. A no first use policy would avoid this.

Sagan deals with three common objections to the United States adopting a declaratory no first use policy.

First, “it would rule out pre-emption or preventive strikes, which may be necessary for US security in the future. This is not true. Military planners would simply develop… contingency plans for conventional forces only.
Second, “no-first-use declarations are simply not believable.” Sagan notes that military leaders pay close attention to declaratory policies. They signal intent and therefore shape expectations of allies and adversaries alike. They are more likely to be believed to the degree that nuclear operations (alert levels, military exercises, deployments) conform to such doctrine.
Third, no first use “assumes an unwarranted degree of certainty about future military threats.” However, if new threats emerge the United States can always change its nuclear posture.

FORUM

The October-November 2009 issue of Survival contains an exchange on Scott Sagan’s article by four experts and his rebuttal.

“Promises and Priorities” by Morton H. Halperin

Morton Halperin, a one-time advocate of no first use, believes that now is not the time to pursue no first use because President Obama has enough on his first-term agenda with a commitment to “reducing the role of nuclear weapons in US national security strategy, negotiating a new Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) with Russia, immediately and aggressively pursuing US ratification of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), and starting on negotiations on a verifiable end to the production of fissional material for weapons purposes.” Rather Halperin favors having a simple statement without elaboration that “The United States maintains nuclear weapons to deter, and if necessary, respond to nuclear attack against ourselves, our forces, or our friends and allies.”

“The Trouble with No First Use” by Bruno Tertrais

Bruno Tertrais from the Foundation for Strategic Research in Paris believes that costs exceed benefits in a no first use policy. He believes that benefits are overrated because adversaries won’t take the declaratory policy seriously. They will realize that the policy isn’t forever binding. This would limit the non-proliferation value of a no first use declaration. And he doubts the commitment trap that Sagan posits because an American president would not be deterred by reputation if he or she wanted to use nuclear weapons in a crisis.

Tertrais believes that the costs of a no first use declaration would be significant. If nuclear weapons are reserved for deterrence of nuclear attack, adversaries will get the idea that they can do anything else and not risk a nuclear response: use chemical weapons, attack with conventional missiles, launch biological weapons. It would prevent a government committed to no first use from striking pre-emptively with nuclear weapons against an adversary who has unmistakably demonstrated an intention to immediately launch a nuclear attack. Allies no longer protected by the U.S. nuclear umbrella might decide to develop their own nuclear weapons.

However, Tertrais acknowledges that “there would be some benefits in altering US declaratory policy to make it clearer that nuclear weapons are for deterrence and could not be used except in extreme circumstances of self-defense, when vital interests are at stake.”

“Strategic Hubris” by Keith B. Payne

Keith B. Payne, president of the National Institute for Public Policy, disagrees with Scott Sagan’s assertion that a no first use policy is necessary for reducing the role of nuclear weapons in U.S. national security strategy. Rather Payne states, “That goal may be advanced by moving where possible to non-nuclear offensive capabilities and active defenses for roles traditionally assigned to nuclear forces.”

As to Sagan’s claim that nuclear first use threats are not necessary to deter non-nuclear attack, including chemical and biological, Payne says that this assertion relies on hunches and is derived from presumptions, not from analysis. However, he admits that the contrary view that nuclear threats can deter such attacks also relies on hunches and that available historical evidence provides no more certain an answer.

In favoring retention of nuclear deterrence for chemical and biological attack Payne cites policies of France and India and recommendations of the U.S. Congressional Strategic Posture Commission of which he was a member. (We observe, though, that the Commission itself provided no thorough analysis for this viewpoint. Because others are doing something is a subjective argument, not proof.)

“No First Use: An Indian View” by K. Subrahmanyam

The author is an Indian strategic analyst who has served as director of the Institute for Defence Studies and Analysis in New Delhi. In supporting a policy of no first use of nuclear weapons he indicates: “The policy of ‘no first use’ embodies the doctrine of deterrence in full measure. It is meant to deter a nuclear adversary from initiating a nuclear strike through the maintenance of a credible and survivable nuclear retaliatory force which can inflict unacceptable damage on an aggressor.”

Subrahmanyam believes that a no first use policy is an essential first step to a world free of nuclear weapons. By diminishing the military role of nuclear weapons this policy contributes to their delegitimization. In contrast, he writes, “The more the role of nuclear weapons is emphasized in the policy documents of the United States the greater the incentive for proliferation aspirants to develop their own nuclear arsenals.”

“Reply: Evidence, Logic and Nuclear Deterrence” by Scott D. Sagan

In responding to Morton Halperin’s recommendation for the United States to delay a no first use policy until other arms control objectives are achieved, Scott Sagan believes that the process of consulting with allies should move forward now. To Halperin’s simple declaratory policy, Sagan would add: “The United States does not need to use its nuclear arsenal to punish any enemy who uses chemical or biological weapons against us or our allies. Our conventional response would be certain, swift, and effective.”

In his reply to Keith Payne’s article, Sagan deals with other writings of Payne that claim that U.S. threat of nuclear retaliation blocked Saddam Hussein from use chemical weapons in the Gulf War of 1991. Sagan cites contrary evidence that Iraq had other reasons for not using chemical weapons as long as U.S. forces didn’t invade Iraq. He notes that Brent Scowcroft, national security advisor to President George H. W. Bush, recalled a crucial White House meeting on January 31, 1991, when the matter of possible Iraq use of chemical weapons came up. Scowcroft wrote, “No one advanced the notion of using nuclear weapons, and the President rejected it even in retaliation for chemical or biological attacks.”

In response to Bruno Tertrais, Sagan disputes Tertrais’ claim of nonproliferation costs of a U.S. no first use policy, saying that political forces in Germany and Japan will keep these nations from going nuclear regardless of any change in U.S. extended deterrence. Sagan rejects Tertrais’ analysis that nuclear treats have prevented chemical and biological attacks, citing other reasons. And Sagan writes that Tertrais underestimates the influence of U.S. policies on other nations, noting how India followed a U.S. model in stating a willingness to use nuclear weapons in response to a chemical or biological attack.

Sagan notes that “K. Subrahmanyam’s essay is an excellent counter to Tertrais position on the sources of nuclear doctrines.” But he disagrees with Subrahmanyam’s proposal for a formal agreement on non-use of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear states. Sagan indicates that the five recognized nuclear weapons states have all made this pledge and that India should join them.