How to Get to Zero
Introduction
Reports of Commission and International Bodies

Canberra Commission (1996)
New Agenda Coalition (1998)
Tokyo Reform (1999)
2000 NPT Review Conference

Common Elements
Steps Towards Zero

De-alerting
Deep Cuts
Disarming Iraq
What's Next?
Scenarios for Achieving Zero Nuclear Weapons

Jonathan Dean
Commander Robert Green
Morton H. Halperin
John P. Holdren
Middle Powers Initiative
David Krieger










On October 24, 1995 (United Nations Day) Australian Prime Minister Paul Keating announced the formation of the Canberra Commission on the Elimination of Nuclear Weapons. Its members were 17 international experts. The Report of the Canberra Commission, issued in August 1996:
  • Made the case for the elimination of nuclear weapons.
  • Offered concrete recommendations on how this could be accomplished.


Members

Celso Amorin, Brazil
General Lee Butler, United States
 Richard Butler, Australia
Field Marshall Lord Michael Carver,
United Kingdom
Jacques-Yves Cousteau, France
Jayantha Dhanapala, Sri Lanka
Rolf Ekeus, Sweden
Mabil Elaraby, Egypt
 Ryukichi Imai, Japan
Ronald McCoy, Malaysia
Robert McNamara, United States
Robert O'Neill, United Kingdom
Qian Jiadong, China
Michael Rocard, France
Joseph Rotblat, United Kingdom
Roald Sagdeev, United States
Maj Brit Theorin, Sweden

Statement of the Commissioners

The Canberra Commission report opened with the following statement of the commissioners:

The destructiveness of nuclear weapons is immense. Any use would be catastrophic.

Nuclear weapons pose an intolerable threat to all humanity and its habitat, yet tens of thousands remain in arsenals built up at an extraordinary time of deep antagonism. That time has passed, yet assertions of their utility continue.

These facts are obvious but their implications have been blurred. There is no doubt that, if the peoples of the world were more fully aware of the inherent danger of nuclear weapons and the consequences of their use, they would reject them, and not permit their continued possession or acquisition on their behalf by their governments, even for an alleged need for self-defense.

Nuclear weapons are held by a handful of states which insist that these weapons provide unique security benefits, and yet reserve uniquely to themselves the right to own them. This situation is highly discriminatory and thus unstable; it cannot be sustained. The possession of nuclear weapons by any state is a constant stimulus to other states to acquire them.

The world faces threats of nuclear proliferation and nuclear terrorism. These threats are growing. They must be removed.

For these reasons, a central reality is that nuclear weapons diminish the security of all states. Indeed, states which possess them become themselves targets of nuclear weapons.

The opportunity now exists, perhaps without precedent or recurrence, to make a new and clear choice to enable the world to conduct its affairs without nuclear weapons and in accordance with the principles of the Charter of the United Nations.

The members of the Canberra Commission call upon the United States, Russia, the United Kingdom, France and China to give the lead by committing themselves, unequivocally, to the elimination of all nuclear weapons. Such a commitment would propel the process in the most direct and imaginative way. All other governments must join this commitment and contribute to its fulfillment.

The Commission has identified a series of steps which can be taken immediately and which would thereupon make the world safer.

The Commission has also described the practical measures which can be taken to bring about the verifiable elimination of nuclear weapons and the full safeguarding of militarily usable nuclear material.

A nuclear weapon free world can be secured and maintained through political commitment, and anchored in an enduring and binding legal framework.

Recommendations for Immediate Steps

The Canberra Commission offered recommendations for a set of immediate steps that could lead to a world free of nuclear weapons:

The first requirement is for the five nuclear weapon states to commit themselves unequivocally to the elimination of nuclear weapons and agree to start work immediately on the practical steps and negotiations required for its achievement....

The commitment by the nuclear weapon states to a nuclear weapon free world must be accompanied by a series of practical, realistic and mutually reinforcing steps. There are a number of such steps that can be taken immediately.... The recommended steps are:

  1. Taking nuclear forces off alert.
  2. Removal of warheads from delivery vehicles.
  3. Ending deployment of non-strategic nuclear weapons.
  4. Ending nuclear testing.
  5. Initiating negotiations to further reduce United States and Russian nuclear arsenals.
  6. Agreement amongst the nuclear weapon states of reciprocal no first use undertakings, and of a non-use undertaking by them in relation to the non-nuclear weapon states.

Reinforcing Steps

The Canberra Commission also recommended the following reinforcing steps:

  1. Action to prevent further horizontal proliferation.
  2. Developing verification arrangements for a nuclear weapon free world.
  3. Cessation of the production of fissile material for nuclear explosive purposes.




In 1998 the foreign affairs ministers of Brazil, Egypt, Ireland, Mexico, New Zealand, Slovenia, South Africa, and Sweden joined together to offer their ideas in a statement entitled Towards a Nuclear-Weapon-Free World: The Need for A New Agenda.

Recommended Actions

Among the measures recommended the New Agenda Coalition are the following:

  1. Bilateral U.S.-Russian mechanisms (such as START) and subsequently plurilateral mechanisms including all the nuclear-weapon states (adding United Kingdom, France, and China) for practical dismantlement and destruction of nuclear armaments.
  2. Abandoning present hair-trigger postures by proceeding to de-alerting and de-activating their weapons.
  3. Removal of non-strategic nuclear weapons from deployed sites.
  4. Reverse of nuclear weapons development and deployment by the three nuclear-weapons-capable states [Israel, India, Pakistan].

  5. All states sign and ratify the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty.
  6. International ban on the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.
  7. Joint no-first use undertaking between the nuclear-weapon states and non-use or threat of use of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon-states.
  8. Establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones in regions of tension, such as the Middle East and South Asia.

 




The Tokyo Forum for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament was organized in August 1998 at the initiative of the Prime Minister of Japan, Mr. Ryutaro Hashimoto and was continued by his successor, Prime Minister Keizo Obuchi. Its 21 members were experts drawn from 15 countries, including all the nuclear-weapon states. The four meetings of the Forum were held in Tokyo; Hiroshima; Pocantico, New York; and again in Tokyo. In July 1999 the Forum issued its report, Facing Nuclear Dangers: An Action Plan for the 21st Century.
Recommendations

The key recommendations of the Tokyo Forum are as follows:

  1. Stop and reverse the unraveling of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty regime by reaffirming the treaty's central bargain.
  2. Eliminate nuclear weapons through phased reductions.
  3. Bring the nuclear test ban into force.
  4. Revitalize START and expand the scope of nuclear reductions.
  5. Adopt nuclear transparency measures.

  6. Zero nuclear weapons on hair-trigger alert.
  7. Control fissile material, especially in Russia.
  8. Prevent weapons of mass destruction from falling into the hands of extremist, fanatical or criminal groups.
  9. Strengthen measures against missile proliferation.
  10. Exercise caution on missile defense deployments.

  11. Stop and reverse proliferation in South Asia.
  12. Eliminate weapons of mass destruction in the Middle East.
  13. Eliminate nuclear and missile dangers on the Korean Peninsula.
  14. No vetoes in support of proliferation in the United Nations Security Council.
  15. Revitalize the Conference on Disarmament.

  16. Strengthen verification for disarmament.
  17. Create effective non-compliance mechanisms for nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament.








The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), which first went into effect in 1970, provides for a review conference every five years to assess progress in achieving the treaty's objectives. The 2000 Review Conference that met at United Nations headquarters in New York was a culmination of efforts to get the nuclear-weapon states to make a firmer commitment to eliminate their nuclear arms, an objective set forth in Article VI. This led to inclusion in the Final Document of the 2000 NPT Review Conference a set of practical steps that should be undertaken to fulfill the purpose of Article VI.
They are as follows:

Practical Steps on Article VI

15. The Conference agrees on the following practical steps for the
systematic and progressive efforts to implement Article VI of the Treaty on
the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and paragraphs 3 and 4(c) of the
1995 Decision on "Principles and Objectives for Nuclear Non-Proliferation
and Disarmament":

  1. The importance and urgency of signatures and ratifications, without delay and without conditions and in accordance with constitutional processes, to achieve the early entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty.

  2. A moratorium on nuclear-weapon-test explosions or any other nuclear explosions pending entry into force of that Treaty.

  3. The necessity of negotiations in the Conference on Disarmament on a non-discriminatory, multilateral and internationally and effectively verifiable treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive
    devices in accordance with the statement of the Special Coordinator in 1995 and the mandate contained therein, taking into consideration both nuclear disarmament and nuclear non-proliferation objectives. The Conference on Disarmament is
    urged to agree on a programme of work which includes the immediate commencement of negotiations on such a treaty with a view to their conclusion within five years.

  4. The necessity of establishing in the Conference on Disarmament an appropriate subsidiary body with a mandate to deal with nuclear disarmament. The Conference on Disarmament is urged to agree on a programme of work which includes the immediate establishment of such a body.

  5. The principle of irreversibility to apply to nuclear disarmament, nuclear and other related arms control and reduction measures.

  6. An unequivocal undertaking by the nuclear-weapon States to accomplish the total elimination of their nuclear arsenals leading to nuclear disarmament to which all States parties are committed under Article VI.

  7. The early entry into force and full implementation of START II and the conclusion of START III as soon as possible while preserving and strengthening the ABM Treaty as a cornerstone of strategic stability and as a basis for further reductions of strategic offensive weapons, in accordance with its provisions.

  8. The completion and implementation of the Trilateral Initiative between the United States of America, the Russian Federation and the International Atomic Energy Agency.

  9. Steps by all the nuclear-weapon States leading to nuclear disarmament in a way that promotes international stability, and based on the principle of undiminished security for all:
  10. Further efforts by the nuclear-weapon States to reduce their nuclear arsenals unilaterally.
  11. Increased transparency by the nuclear-weapon States with regard to the nuclear weapons capabilities and the implementation of agreements pursuant to Article VI and as a voluntary confidence-building measure to support further progress on nuclear disarmament.
  12. The further reduction of non-strategic nuclear weapons, based on unilateral initiatives and as an integral part of the nuclear arms reduction and disarmament process.
  13. Concrete agreed measures to further reduce the operational status of nuclear weapons systems.
  14. A diminishing role for nuclear weapons in security policies to minimize the risk that these weapons ever be used and to facilitate the process of their total elimination.
  15. The engagement as soon as appropriate of all the nuclear-weapon States in the process leading to the total elimination of their nuclear weapons.

  16. Arrangements by all nuclear-weapon States to place, as soon as practicable, fissile material designated by each of them as no longer required for military purposes under IAEA or other relevant international verification and arrangements for the disposition of such material for peaceful purposes, to ensure that such material remains permanently outside of military programmes.

  17. Reaffirmation that the ultimate objective of the efforts of States in the disarmament process is general and complete disarmament under effective international control.

  18. Regular reports, within the framework of the NPT strengthened review process, by all States parties on the implementation of Article VI and paragraph 4 (c) of the 1995 Decision on "Principles and Objectives for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament", and recalling the Advisory Opinion of the International Court of Justice of 8 July 1996.

  19. The further development of the verification capabilities that will be required to provide assurance of compliance with nuclear disarmament agreements for the achievement and maintenance of a nuclear-weapon-free world.

 




Efforts to eliminate nuclear weapons in this first decade of the 21st century can build upon ideas developed in the 1990s by several distinguished commissions and study groups. From their reports and recommendations a consensus has emerged on some of the major steps along the road toward zero nuclear weapons. They are as follows:
  1. De-alerting and standing down deployed nuclear weapons.
  2. Comprehensive test ban.
  3. Cease development and production of new nuclear weapons.
  4. Halt attempts to develop national missile defense.
  5. Commitment to no first use of nuclear weapons.
  6. Bilateral (U.S. and Russia) nuclear arms reduction.
  7. Bring other possessors of nuclear weapons into multilateral reductions.
  8. Total dismantlement of nuclear weapons and delivery systems.
  9. International system for transparency and verification.
  10. International control of fissile materials.

 
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