· Three to four stages of reduction.
-- Initially bilateral reductions by the United States.
-- Then multilateral reductions by all possessors of nuclear weapons.
-- Eventually total elimination (recommended in three of the four reports)
· De-alerting weapons at each stage.
· Dismantlement of weapons taken out of service.
· Transparency, verification, and monitoring.

In 2002 this subject came up again in hearings of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on the Moscow Treaty of 2002. Witnesses offered observations on what might be next for deep cuts in U.S. and Russian Nuclear Weapons.

The Atlantic Council of the United States is a nonpartisan network of leaders who support the central role of the Atlantic community in the contemporary world situation. In 1991 under the leadership of General Andrew J. Goodpaster, (US Army, ret), the Atlantic Council began a Project on Nuclear Arms Control. Its purpose was to develop a common vision for international leaders on how to reduce the risks posed by nuclear weapons.

Consultation Papers by General Goodpaster


Pivotal to the project were three consultation papers written by General Goodpaster. The first was entitled "Tighter Limits on Nuclear Arms: Issues and Opportunities for a New Era" (May 1992). The paper proposed two interrelated policy initiatives:

Feedback from this first paper led General Goodpaster to write a second paper, "Further Reigns on Nuclear Arms: Next Steps for the Major Nuclear Powers" (August 1993). He wrote, "it now seems desirable to propose a 'no-first-use' commitment by the major nuclear powers, with certain minimum specified exceptions." He further developed his ideas for three progressively lower arms levels.

General Goodpaster's third paper was entitled "Shaping the Nuclear Future: Toward a More Comprehensive Approach" (December 1997). He offered a more concrete schedule of five discrete steps for the nuclear powers to reduce to 100 to 200 warheads each by 2015 or very soon thereafter. For a more comprehensive approach General Goodpaster presented a new strategic concept -- reassurance -- to guide policy decisions on nuclear force posture. Reassurance, he wrote, is:

Other Papers

Among other papers of the Atlantic Council's Project on Nuclear Arms Control were "START III Negotiations: How Far and How Fast" (October 1996) by Oleg N. Bykov and Jack Mendelsohn and "The Road Beyond START: How Far Should We Go?" (March 1997) by Jonathan Dean.

The Henry L. Stimson Center is a nonprofit, nonpartisan institution devoted to public policy research on international security issues. In 1994 the Center launched a multi-year Project on Eliminating Weapons of Mass Destruction. In December 1995 the Project Steering Committee, chaired by General Andrew J. Goodpaster, (USA, ret) issued a report entitled "An Evolving US Nuclear Posture" which laid out four phases for moving toward the elimination of nuclear weapons.

The Stimson Center report made the case for change in U.S. nuclear posture on the basis of:

· Declining utility of nuclear weapons in the post-cold war world.
· Significant costs and risks in continued possession of nuclear weapons and reliance on nuclear deterrence, including:
-- Economic costs
-- Political costs (especially negative effect on nuclear non-proliferation)
-- Nuclear accidents and incidents
-- Risk of nuclear use

The report laid out four phases for the global elimination of nuclear weapons. It would begin in the United States with a "Presidential statement of renewed, decisive commitment to the goal of eliminating all nuclear weapons." The nuclear force levels and operational status for each phase would be as follows:

Phase I
· Bilateral reductions by the United States and Russia to roughly 2,000 warheads each.
· Reduced alert status.
· New measures to increase the transparency of each nation's nuclear forces.

Phase II
· Multilateral reductions to approximately 100 warheads each.
· Reduced alert status for all declared nuclear powers.
· Nuclear transparency measures extended to smaller nuclear powers.

Phase III
· All remaining arsenals cut to tens of weapons for each possessor.
· Possible nuclear "trustee" arrangement.

Phase IV
· Residual arsenals eliminated.
· Internationally monitored/controlled reconstitution capability.

National Academy of Sciences, 1997

In the mid-1990s the Committee on International Security and Arms Control, National Academy of Sciences embarked upon a study of the nuclear weapons policies in the post-cold war era. The study group was chaired by Major General William F. Burns (U.S.Army, ret.). It produced a report entitled The Future of U.S. Nuclear Weapons Policy. Committee Members John P. Holdren, chair John D. Steinbruner General William F. Burns (USA, ret) General George Lee Butler (USAF, ret) Paul M. Doty Steve Fetter Alexander H. Flax Richard L. Garwin Rose Gottemoeller Spurgeon M, Keeny, Jr. Joshua Lederberg Matthew Meselson Wolfgang K.H. Panofsky C. Kumar N. Patel Jonathan D. Pollack Admiral Robert H. Wertheim (USN, ret)

Summary

The report from the National Academy of Sciences describes how U.S. and Russian nuclear forces and policies have evolved since the Cold War ended. It sets forth a two-part program of change.

Progressive Constraints

For near- and mid-term the Committee offered a program of progressive constraints. It would start with the United States and Russia and then bring China, France, and the United Kingdom into the reduction process. (The report was completed before India and Pakistan conducted their nuclear weapon tests.)

Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons

The report from the National Academy of Sciences also discussed the possible prohibition of nuclear weapons. A news release on the report noted:

The second and long-term phase of the program recommended by the committee calls for examining how continuing changes in international relations could make it both desirable and possible to prohibit the possession of nuclear weapons. The path to a complete ban on nuclear weapons is not now clear, the committee acknowledged, but the potential benefits of a ban warrant serious efforts to identify and promote the conditions that would make this possible.

One such condition would be comprehensive verification of potential weapons-related activities, which would require an unprecedented degree of international cooperation and openness.

In 1998 the Deep Cuts Study Group, Brookings Institution in Washington, D.C. held a series of meetings to consider the possibility of deep reductions in nuclear arms. After exchanging drafts of chapters, the nine members produced a book entitled The Nuclear Turning Point (Brookings Institution, 1999). The book's subtitle describes its purpose: A Blueprint for Deep Cuts and De-alerting of Nuclear Weapons.

A Strategy of Staged Reductions and De-alerting Nuclear Forces

The authors concentrated on how to achieve very deep cuts but not complete abolition of nuclear weapons. They offered a three-stage program for deep cuts in which all the weapons remaining at each stage are de-alerted and a large part are deactivated. Excerpts from their summary description in chapter two are as follows:

Relationship to Abolition
This is not complete abolition, but it amounts to the longest steps in that direction that can be realistically projected under current international conditions.

Excerpts reproduced with permission of the Brookings Institution. Reformatted for emphasis.

What's Next after the Moscow Treaty of 2002?
by Howard W. Hallman
Chair, Methodists United for Peace with Justice

Now that the U.S. Senate and the Russian Duma have ratified the Moscow Treaty of 2002, it is timely to consider what should happen next to achieve further reductions in nuclear weapons. This is relevant because many persons believe that the Moscow Treaty doesn't go nearly far or fast enough in eliminating strategic nuclear weapons.

Moreover, the two presidents who signed the treaty, George W. Bush and Vladimir Putin, stated in a joint declaration: "The United States and Russia declare their intention to carry out strategic offensive reductions to the lowest possible levels consistent with their national security requirements and alliance obligations, and reflecting the new nature of their strategic relations." They indicated that the Moscow Treaty was a major step but recognized that more is needed and possible.

Views of Eight Experts

Insights about what might come next are provided in the testimony of eight American experts at hearings conducted by the U.S. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations and published and made available on-line as Treaty on Strategic Offensive Reduction: The Moscow Treaty, italic (U.S. Government Printing Office, 2002. These experts are:

Here is a sample of what they said.

Reductions Are Desirable but No Timetable

General Habiger pointed out that "there is only one thing in the world that can destroy the United States of America today, and that is the Russian nuclear warheads. That is why this treaty and
. . . follow-on steps . . . are so essential to our security." (p. 141)

Senator Nunn noted, however, that "concerns have been raised that the treaty includes no benchmarks for progress or mechanism for verification, no timetable for reductions, no obligations to eliminate warheads, launches, or silos." (p. 128) Christopher Paine noted the lack of "any interim reduction milestones for assessing compliance." (p. 169) Dr. Gottemoeller agreed that absence of a timetable is a significant problem. (p. 218)

De-alerting

Professor Holdren observed that the treaty "does not address the 'alert' status of the strategic nuclear forces that remain." He noted that "this is both the most anomalous and the most dangerous characteristic of the Russian and US strategic nuclear forces persisting into the post-Cold war era." (p. 239)

Senator Nunn also expressed concern about "the high alert status of our arsenals that gives our countries the capacity for a rapid massive nuclear attack that would incinerate our nations and the world as we know it." (p. 129) He advocated taking nuclear weapons off high alert. "We could begin," he indicated, "by ordering an immediate operational stand-down of weapons on both sides that are now scheduled for reductions." (p. 130) Ambassador Goodby supported "early deactivation of systems scheduled for withdrawal from the deployed force." (p. 230)

General Habiger specifically recommended immediate stand-down of "four Ohio class Trident submarines and all 50 Peacekeepers." Moving more weapons off alert status, he said, would give leaders more decision time." He recommended that "the teams working on this matter be led in large measure by the people who actually built the weapons themselves. They... understand them , and they are key to designing the system to take weapons off alert status in ways that make sense, are transparent but not intrusive, and do not compromise our security." (p. 140)

Secretary Perry indicated that the treaty "misses the opportunity to reduce the danger to both countries of an accidental or unauthorized launch of nuclear weapons. He supported General Habiger's suggestion for "a mutual reduction of the high alert status of our strategic forces." (p. 205) Dr. Iklé, who was a top defense official during the Reagan Administration, agreed. He pointed out, "A cushion of time gives an opportunity to correct an error if you find it." (p.208)

Dismantlement

Senator Nunn pointed out, "The Treaty includes no obligation to eliminate warheads, launchers or silos." He added, "The goal of stability would be substantially advanced by both sides dismantling a large number of nuclear weapons from each nation's stockpile." (p.134)

Secretary Perry also expressed concern that the treaty "does not provide for the dismantlement of the nuclear weapons taken off deployment status." (p. 206) Ambassador Goodby stressed the need for "irreversibility in connection with dismantlement of excess nuclear weapons." (p. 230)

On this issue Dr. Gottemoeller picked up the words of the 1997 Helsinki statement by former Presidents Bill Clinton and Boris Yeltsin to "promote the irreversibility of deep reductions including prevention of rapid increase in the number of warheads." She noted that this "would in particular begin to address the uncertainties that have followed from U.S. statements under the Nuclear Posture Review that it will maintain a very large reserve of warheads available for redeployment, rather than eliminating them." (p.233)

General Habiger advocated, "We and the Russians should agreed to destroy a significant number of warheads planned for reduction under the treaty. . . . We should be identifying weapons we do not need and begin destroying them. This is not as simplistic as it may appear, since most of our dismantlement capability was eliminated in the mid-1990s." (p. 140-141)

Senator Dick Lugar (R-IN) noted that the Russians are dismantling missiles taken out of service because they receive financial support from the Cooperative Threat Reduction Program which he and Senator Nunn co-authored. (p. 212) Ambassdor Goodby pointed out the need to permanently eliminate the need for annual waiver of certain provisions. (p. 228)

Transparency and Verification

Several experts noted the lack of provisions for transparency and verification in the Moscow Treaty of 2002. Secretary Perry spoke of the importance of transparency. (p. 205). Professor Holdren indicated, "Lack of transparency is hobbling US-Russian cooperation to improve the protection of nuclear weapons and nuclear explosive materials against theft." (p. 241) "Only through transparency," General Habiger insisted, "can former enemies convince themselves that we wish them well and mean them no harm." (p. 139)

Senator Nunn said, "I hope that in the future the United States will put forward a comprehensive transparency proposal that includes all of our operationally deployed systems, and at this time Russia will respond constructively to that suggestion." (p. 128)

Dr. Gottemoeller indicated that transparency measures should relate to conversion and other treatment of launch vehicles and also to warheads. She believes that "the United States and Russia could readily establish transparency measures in warhead storage facilities." (p. 219)

Ambassador Goodby stated that measures to enhance transparency of reductions should include exchanges of data, schedules for removing systems from operational deployment, and spot checks of systems removed from deployment. (pp. 229-230)

Christopher Paine recommended that inactive stockpile weapons should be "stored in secure facilities subject to periodic US-Russian bilateral cooperative monitoring measures." (p. 178)

General Habiger favors a system of verification tailored to the specific treaty. He indicated that "the verification protocol should be developed by the operators themselves....The operators know all the games and the tricks. They know what you would need to see to be satisfied in order to get a complete picture." (p. 140)

Tactical Nuclear Weapons

In their testimony several experts indicated that dealing with tactical nuclear weapons -- the ones used for shorter range than strategic weapons -- is important unfinished business. Secretary Perry warned, "the most serious security threat to America today is theft or purchase of a nuclear weapon by a well-organized, well-financed terrorist group." (p. 205)

General Habiger stated, "We need a signed agreement on these weapons, one that will help us count them, secure them, monitor them, and begin to eliminate them. These are nuclear weapons most attractive to terrorists. We need to move on this issue immediately." (p. 141)

Senator Nunn recommended, "The United States and Russia should insist on accurate accounting and adequate safeguards for tactical nuclear weapons, including most importantly a baseline inventory of these weapons with sufficient transparency to assure each other that these weapons are being handled in a safe and secure manner." (p. 1290

Intermediate-range Missiles

Ken Adelman, director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency during the Reagan Administration, also testified in support of the Moscow Treaty of 2002. Unlike the experts quoted above, he didn't call for formal verification provisions and other measures of greater specificity. However, he advocated that the Intermediate-range Nuclear Force (INF) Treaty, signed by President Reagan and President Gorbachev in 1987 that eliminated U.S. and Soviet intermediate range ballistic missiles capable of carrying nuclear weapons should now be open to all nations. He believes that "weapons of mass destruction carried on ballistic missiles are among the threats facing America and all democratic civilized nations". Therefore, "an internationalized INF treaty would help to make the world safer." (p. 149)