As a member of the U.S. Foreign Service, Ambassador Jonathan Dean served as U.S. representative to the NATO-Warsaw Pact force reduction negotiations in Vienna between1973 and 1981. Since 1984 he has been advisor on international security issues to the Union of Concerned Scientists.

Getting Serious about Nuclear Disarmament December 2002 Summary The danger that nuclear weapons might be used appears to be increasing at this time. The situation as regards nuclear proliferation and nuclear disarmament has seriously deteriorated and risks becoming even more serious. Action is needed to neutralize nuclear arsenals. Fourteen steps are proposed: (1) In stage one reduction of U.S. and Russia arsenals to 1,000 warheads each. (2) U.S. and Russia end production of fissile material, dismantle all reduced warheads, and turn over fissile material to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). (3) China, the United Kingdom, France, Israel, India, and Pakistan join a system of nuclear controls. (4) In stage two a level of 200 warheads for U.S., Russia, China, UK, and France and 100 each for India, Pakistan, and Israel. (5) Reduced weapons dismantled and fissile material turned over to IAEA. (6) Remaining arsenals put in monitored storage. (7) Delivery systems reduced. (8) Warhead storage hardened and defended by owner states. (9) With advanced notice, stored nuclear weapons could be withdrawn in a national emergency. (10) Each weapon state could retain up to three operational warheads. (11) Weapon states could retaliate jointly against use or threatened use of nuclear weapons. (12) Establish a more effective non-nuclear proliferation regime. (13) Achieve effective control of biological weapons. (14) If UN Security Council cannot agree on remedial action to deal with non-compliance on nuclear or biological control agreements, five states may take joint action against the offender.

Current Situation of Nuclear Disarmament

Next to war itself, nuclear weapons represent the greatest continuing danger to humanity, extending, at least in theoretical calculations, to the extinction of the human species. Viewed objectively, that danger appears to be increasing at this time.

Even those opposed to possible war in Iraq must admit that the Bush administration has energetically pursued the issue of possible proliferation of nuclear weapons to rogue states and terrorists. But the administration has done this unilaterally and at the cost of ignoring or even condoning the nuclear weapons activities of states which already possess nuclear arsenals.

There is justified worry about the security of the Russian nuclear arsenal from theft and diversion. It is also a fact that Russia has revoked its no-first-use policy and has repeatedly failed to reach agreement with the United States on transparency exchange of information about the numbers and locations of each government's nuclear warheads.

China, France, the UK, two recent proliferants, India and Pakistan, and Israel, a long-time proliferant, have joined the United States in the partnership against terrorism, and their nuclear arsenals are apparently viewed as benign, although, for one, India and Pakistan continue at loggerheads. The administration argues that both Iraq and Iran are moving toward development of nuclear weapons. North Korea has revealed itself as a two-time violator of the Non-Proliferation Treaty. Obviously, the state of non-proliferation is not good.

Nor is the situation of nuclear disarmament. In the May 2002 Moscow agreement, the U.S. and Russia agreed to take several thousand warheads off operational alert and to reduce the levels of deployed strategic warheads to about 2,000 for each country. But there is nothing enduring about this transaction. The reduced warheads will be stored for possible redeployment. There is no commitment to further reductions. Tactical nuclear warheads were not constrained or reduced.

For its part, the U.S. has annulled the ABM Treaty with its limit on the number of deployed missile interceptors, and is energetically pursuing a program of missile defense including ultimate weaponization of space. In the long term, these actions will result in increasing the nuclear arsenals of the other nuclear weapon states. U.S.-Russian negotiation in the Clinton administration to carry out monitored destruction of warheads withdrawn from operational deployment has been dropped.

The U.S. has retained its own first-use policy and has lowered the nuclear threshold for possible use of U.S. nuclear weapons: The U.S. Nuclear Posture Review submitted to Congress at the beginning of 2002 threatened use of nuclear weapons in response to the use of chemical and biological weapons and "unforeseen circumstances" and broadened the circle of potential target states. The administration followed this action with a security doctrine which threatened preemptive attack, possibly including the use of nuclear weapons, on those preparing to attack the United States.

In the 2002 meeting of the Preparatory Committee for the 2005 Review Conference on performance of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, the Bush administration representative indicated that the administration considered null and void commitments undertaken by the Clinton administration at the 2000 NPT review conference.

Of the eight known nuclear weapon states - U.S., Russia, China, UK, France, India, Pakistan, and Israel - only two, the U.S. and Russia, have accepted specific limits on the size of their deployed nuclear arsenals. The United States has refused to ratify the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty and appears to be edging toward resumption of nuclear tests to develop earth penetrating warheads. There has been no progress towards a treaty to end production of fissile material for nuclear weapons.

The evidence seems incontrovertible that the situation as regards nuclear proliferation and nuclear disarmament has seriously deteriorated and risks becoming even more serious.

Action Needed

If this situation is viewed rationally (rather than from the viewpoint of current political feasibility), then, logically, what is needed to cope with it is international action to get serious about nuclear disarmament while simultaneously tightening the non-proliferation regime for both nuclear and biological weapons. The dangers from chemical weapons appear more under control, given a relatively effective international regime and the very large amounts of chemical weapons needed for strategic attack, though dangers of small-scale, localized, terrorism remain. However, given greatly increased concern over the use of biological weapons, there is little prospect of gaining agreement to far-reaching moves on nuclear disarmament without dealing at the same time with the biological weapons issue by establishing a more effective non-proliferation regime for both types of weapons. At the same time, only serious moves of nuclear disarmament will make politically feasible this second action of tightening the non-proliferation regime.

Neutralizing Nuclear Arsenals

Nuclear disarmament might best be pursued through a program of "neutralizing" nuclear arsenals. Neutralizing nuclear arsenals can be achieved by reducing the national holdings of all known nuclear weapon states to a minimal residual force which is then immobilized by separating warheads from launchers and storing both under international monitoring on the territory of the owner state. The following individual steps are needed:

(1) The U.S. and Russia should agree to reduce their total arsenal of nuclear weapons to one thousand warheads each, this total to include all strategic and tactical, deployed and stored warheads.

(2) The two governments would agree to exchange full information on the nature, types, amounts and location of existing warheads and fissile material, to conclude a bilateral (later multilateral) agreement to formally end production of fissile material for weapons, to dismantle all reduced warheads under bilateral supervision, and to turn over fissile material from these weapons to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) for monitored secure storage.

(3) These actions would be dependent on agreement by the remaining nuclear weapon states - China, UK, France, Israel, India and Pakistan - to join in a system of nuclear controls, to include no increase agreements and exchange of information on their nuclear arsenals and their agreement to an international treaty ending production of fissile material for the nuclear weapons.

(4) In a second stage, all the nuclear weapon states would drastically reduce their nuclear arsenals to a level of 200 each total warheads for the NPT weapon states - U.S., Russia, China, UK, and France - and 100 each for India, Pakistan and Israel.

(5) Reduced weapons would be dismantled and the fissile material turned over to the IAEA for secure storage.

(6) Remaining arsenals would be placed in storage on the territory of the owner state and placed under multilateral monitoring, either by the IAEA, by mixed teams of owner state nationals, or by a combination of the two.

(7) Delivery systems - missiles and nuclear-capable aircraft - would be reduced and limited in conformity with warhead reductions in order to reduce the danger from concealed weapons.

(8) For the same reason, warhead storage could be in up to ten separate sites on the territory of owner states, which could be hardened and defended by owner state forces, including on-site missile defenses.

(9) Stored nuclear weapons could be withdrawn by the owner state in a situation of national emergency, but not without giving notice. Monitors would not seek to prevent reopening of storage sites, but would warn all other participants in the system if this occurred.

(10) If concern over possible cheating remains high, in order to further protect against the possibility of concealed weapons, each weapon state could be permitted to retain up to three operational warheads with an equal number of single warhead ground or sea launchers, sufficient for damaging retaliation against an offender, but not enough to launch decisive attack on another state.

(11) Weapon state governments would agree among themselves to retaliate jointly against any of their number or any other state or organization which used or threatened use of nuclear weapons.

(12) Also necessary is a more effective non-nuclear proliferation regime, to include compulsory adherence both to normal IAEA safeguards and to the additional (post-Iraq 1991) protocol of the IAEA, acceptance of the right of the IAEA to place sensors of all kinds on the territory of member states, and agreement among all states parties to the NPT that efforts to avoid these requirements will be met with sanctions by other parties to the treaty, including the use of military force.

This system would make large-scale nuclear surprise attack, and accidental or unauthorized nuclear launch nearly impossible, as well as diversion of nuclear warheads or fissile material. It would be a giant step toward nuclear disarmament, representing the final stage of nuclear disarmament before elimination of nuclear weapons.

(13) This degree of nuclear disarmament would be possible only if there is effective control of biological weapons, including an effective compliance regime. Therefore, it could be accepted only if there were an agreed compliance system, including full transparency, for the Biological Weapons Convention, backed by explicit agreement among member states to take joint military action against violators as an integral part of the compliance regime.

(14) If there still is strong continuing concern about the possibility of non-compliance and concealed weapons after the steps described, it could also be agreed that, in the event there is evidence of non-compliance on either nuclear or biological control agreements, but the UN Security Council cannot agree on a course of remedial action, any five parties to the Treaty may take joint action against the offender. In these circumstances, insistence on retaining nuclear or biological weapon capability would be considered a greater evil than the use of armed force.

These steps and the greatly decreased possibility of use or threat of use of nuclear weapons they will bring will create the conditions, including greater cooperation among nuclear weapon states, dependable transparency, and enhanced effectiveness of the Security Council and the UN system, necessary for final and complete elimination of nuclear weapons.

During his service in the British Royal Navy from 1962 to 1982, Commander Robert Green flew nuclear-armed aircraft for nine years and served in the intelligence service. During his navy career he became disillusioned with nuclear deterrence. In 1991 he became chair of the UK branch of the World Court Project. He is now co-coordinator with his wife, Kate Dewes, of the Peace Foundation's Disarmament & Security Centre in New Zealand.

 

Where Next For Nuclear Abolitionists?
November 2002

Summary

In the United States the Bush administration has a lengthening track record of rejection of international treaties, linked to its near-contempt for international law and single-minded drive for military "full spectrum". The Bush administration has doubts about traditional nuclear deterrence policies. Instead it has revived ballistic missile defense. In dealing with Russia on strategic weapons, it has excluded China with negative implications for nuclear proliferation in Asia. It has made use of nuclear weapons more likely.

The key to progress toward nuclear abolition is to focus on practical projects to reduce the risk of nuclear war. Four candidates are offered for consideration:

(1) Challenge launch-on-warning.

(2) Challenge nuclear deterrence.

(3) Offer more credible alternatives.

(4) Intensify non-violent direct action upholding the law.

Following the Bush administration's Nuclear Posture Review (NPR), the April 2002 preparatory meeting at the UN in New York for the next review of the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) in 2005, and the 2002 UN General Assembly Disarmament Session, this is an appropriate moment to assess where the international anti-nuclear movement should focus their energies.

First, however, consideration will be given to how prospects for nuclear abolition could be affected by US responses to growing doubts about nuclear deterrence, including its plans for Ballistic Missile Defence (BMD). The focus on the US reflects the overwhelming influence of the world's first and sole remaining nuclear-armed superpower. The Bush administration has a lengthening track record of rejection of international treaties, linked to its near-contempt for international law and single-minded drive for military "full spectrum dominance".

There is thus an urgent need to explore "outside the box" ways to make progress towards nuclear abolition. These should try to build upon the few current campaigns which seem to have some traction, and lessons learned from three successful past campaigns: the World Court Project; the "Ottawa Process" which led to a treaty banning anti-personnel landmines, and the campaign for an International Criminal Court.

Responses to Doubts about Nuclear Deterrence

Almost the only encouraging aspect of current US nuclear policy is Bush's public admission of doubt about the effectiveness of nuclear deterrence against the primary threat: extremists armed with weapons of mass destruction (WMD). What is more, both his Vice-President Dick Cheney and Secretary of State Colin Powell rejected use of nuclear weapons against Iraqi forces in the Gulf War, [1] which means that any future comparable US nuclear threat would lack credibility.

One of Bush's responses has been to revive BMD in both its national and "theatre" forms, and to augment conventional offensive strike systems. Through this combination, he hopes to strengthen conventional deterrence and raise the threshold for use of strategic nuclear weapons. At first sight, this would appear to be a positive development for nuclear disarmament, especially after Bush and Putin signed the "Strategic Offensive Reductions" Treaty and with inauguration of the new NATO-Russia Council in May 2002.

Unfortunately, Bush's piecemeal approach with Russia excludes China, the only other nuclear-armed state with superpower potential. There are no plans for a NATO-China Council, or for sharing BMD technology with China. On the contrary, China understandably perceives current US collaboration with both Japan and Taiwan to develop theatre BMD systems as threatening its land-based nuclear-armed intercontinental ballistic missiles, of which currently it is believed to have less than 20. As it modernises its arsenal of only about 400 nuclear warheads, China will be able to use US theatre BMD plans to justify expanding its nuclear capability. This will inevitably ratchet up India's, to which Pakistan will feel pressured to respond. Thus one long-term consequence of deploying BMD will be to stifle any further progress in nuclear disarmament, because the US will argue that it cannot make further reductions in light of these developments, and Russia will feel forced to follow suit.

Another US response to doubts about nuclear deterrence has been to make nuclear weapon use more likely. The NPR recommends using low-yield nuclear weapons against hardened or deeply buried non-nuclear WMD targets or bunkers where conventional weapons might be ineffective. This might be driven by the perceived need to restore US credibility in light of the Cheney/Powell decision in the Gulf War. However, it is an incitement to nuclear proliferation, as it would gut US assurances not to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear NPT signatory states, including the "axis of evil" trio of Iran, Iraq and North Korea plus Libya and Syria. Since this became clear, the UK government has echoed its "master's voice" by warning that it too is prepared to use nuclear weapons if its forces, not just national territory, are subjected to WMD attack.

Where Next for Nuclear Abolitionists?

One positive spin-off from US nuclear plans, the South Asian nuclear crisis, and US allegations of revived nuclear weapon development by Iraq and North Korea is that the issue of nuclear weapons is again high on the international media agenda. Of course, use of even one low-yield nuclear weapon by the US for the first time since Nagasaki (or by Israel) would cause worldwide outrage and reawaken the anti-nuclear mass movement - as would a nuclear war between India and Pakistan.

Nevertheless, acquisition by the five recognised nuclear states of their nuclear arsenals involved probably their greatest investment in financial, political and human terms since the Second World War. After over fifty years of their own propaganda, none of these governments would risk breaking out of the nuclear club without finding a replacement system with clear advantages to balance the perceived loss of security.

In struggles to overthrow oppression and injustice like the abolition of slavery and South African apartheid, there was often a phase when progress stalled before the status quo was shifted. The seemingly invincible regressive forces, no longer bothering to pay lip-service to progress, openly hardened their positions. One reason for this was awareness by the regressive forces that their arguments were failing, especially on the two anvils of practicality and the law.

At such moments, the key to further progress is to focus on practical projects which go to the heart of the issue and uphold the law, while helping to reduce the risk of nuclear war and shift the pro-nuclear mindset. Using these criteria, the following four candidates are offered for consideration:

1) Challenge Launch-on-Warning. The NPR claims that US strategic nuclear forces are not on "hair-trigger" alert. How does this square with persisting reports that, despite Bush's determination to transform the US relationship with Russia and to "replace Mutual Assured Destruction with Mutual Cooperation", some 2,000 strategic nuclear warheads on each side are still held at "launch-on-warning" readiness? This must be challenged, using Alan Phillips' excellent Canadian Ploughshares paper, and perhaps by expanding the US "Back from the Brink" campaign. [2]

2) Challenge Nuclear Deterrence. Following directly from (1), the world must be told that the pro-nuclear deterrence lobby is faltering. Winning this argument is crucial to shifting the mindset against nuclear weapons, especially among the military. Little further progress towards nuclear abolition is possible without explaining why nuclear deterrence does not work, is immoral and unlawful, and there are more credible and acceptable alternative security strategies. [3]

3) Offer More Credible Alternatives. The UK holds most promise of becoming the first nuclear state to reject nuclear deterrence. It has cut its nuclear arsenal to about 185 warheads, the smallest of the recognised nuclear states, deployed in one delivery system: 16 submarine-launched US Trident ballistic missiles in each of four submarines, one of which is deployed at a notice to fire of "days". The UK government has to decide whether to replace Trident by around 2007. Exploiting US plans to convert four Ohio class Trident-equipped submarines to conventional armament, I have therefore proposed that the UK government should replace its nuclear arsenal with precision-guided, conventionally-armed cruise missiles plus special forces. [4] This would provide a more credible deterrence system, which the Navy would in principle support. The first "breakout" by one of the five permanent members of the UN Security Council would be sensational: the UK government would throw its weight behind the nuclear abolition movement, as Canada did so effectively in the campaign for a treaty banning landmines.

Intensify Non-Violent Direct Action Upholding The Law. Meanwhile, as another incentive for the governments of nuclear states to consider non-nuclear security options, carefully focused and sustained non-violent direct action campaigns in the nuclear states to uphold the law should be ntensified. The UK Trident Ploughshares campaign, relying on legal attrition supported by the Acronym Institute, World Court Project, CND and other anti-nuclear groups, continues to embarrass the government, Royal Navy and police, with growing support from church leaders, politicians and such stars as Sir Sean Connery. The judiciary and government have been forced into a legal debate. This has moved beyond the 1996 World Court advisory opinion to confront the legal status of nuclear deterrence and possessing specific types of nuclear weapon with readiness and intent to use them, even against non-nuclear states and extremists. [5]

Notes
1. Colin Powell, 'A Soldier's Way' (Hutchinson, London, 1995), pp485-486.
2. See http://backfromthebrink.policy.net/; also Canadian Ploughshares Working Paper 02-1 'No Launch on Warning' by Alan Phillips MD (www.ploughshares.ca).
3. Robert Green, 'The Naked Nuclear Emperor: Debunking Nuclear Deterrence' (Disarmament & Security Centre, PO Box 8390, Christchurch, New Zealand, 2000) (www.disarmsecure.org).
4. 'Conventionally-Armed UK Trident?' (RUSI Journal, February 2002), pp31-34, available on request from robwcpuk@chch.planet.org.nz.
5. See www.tridentploughshares.org, www.acronym.org.uk, www.gn.apc.org/wcp, www.cnduk.org.

Morton H. Halperin is a senior fellow of the Council on Foreign Relations. He has served in the Department of Defense and National Security Council in the Clinton, Nixon, and Johnson administrations. He was also director of the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU). He offered his ideas on steps toward zero nuclear weapons in an article on "Defining 'Eliminating' Nuclear Weapons" in Disarmament Diplomacy, October 1997.

Defining "Eliminating" Nuclear Weapons
October 1997

Excerpts

In international disarmament negotiations there is a stalemate between non-nuclear weapon states which call for a timetable for the elimination of nuclear weapons and the nuclear weapon states which have refused to commit to a timetable. The way out of this impasse is to redefine the end state of "zero" nuclear weapons.

"The current definition of zero assumes that nuclear States, as well as all other States, will progressively destroy their entire nuclear arsenal until there are no nuclear weapons left in existence. . . ."

". . . . Since nuclear weapons pose a threat to international security, any viable long-run solution must be based on the equality of all States, prevent all States from relying on the use or the threat of the use of nuclear weapons for any purpose, and eliminate the danger of accidental, inadvertent, or unauthorized use of nuclear weapons.

"A redefinition of zero nuclear weapons that meets this criteria, is verifiable, and does not depend on fundamental changes in the nature of international politics could consist of the following:

"First, firm international security assurances - both negative and positive - must be put in place with the support of the UN Security Council. The international community should pledge to respond collectively if a State threatens to use nuclear weapons against any other State - regardless of the context - or if a State reverses the process of nuclear disarmament described below. In addition, all States should agree not to threaten to initiate the use of nuclear weapons or to use such nuclear threats first (i.e., not to seek to use nuclear weapons as an instrument of policy).

"Second, all nations must accept the ruling of the International Court of Justice on nuclear weapons and commit to the complete nuclear disarmament contained in the Non-Proliferation Treaty. . . .

"Third, this international cooperation on nuclear disarmament should take the form of all States agreeing to implement a step by step plan to remove nuclear weapons from their arsenals and render them useless. . . .This process. . . would dictate that all States:

1. Agree to destroy all warheads in excess of 2,000 and publicly describe both their arsenal of nuclear warheads and the delivery systems to which they are or may be mated.
2. Agree not to make any efforts to improve or expand their nuclear arsenals.
3. Agree to progressively separate their existing nuclear warheads from delivery systems by removing a certain percentage of such warheads each year.
4. Begin a process of separating nuclear cores from nuclear warheads once all warheads had been separated from their delivery systems.
5. Begin a process of reducing the number of nuclear cores from the maximum of 2,000 agreed to at the start of the disarmament process. Over a period of an additional five years, all States would reduce their storage of nuclear cores to no more than two hundred.

Zero nuclear weapons would thus be defined as an end state of no more than eight nuclear States, each with no more than two hundred nuclear cores separated from their warheads and delivery systems. (States that now have fewer than two hundred warheads would not increase to that number). . . .

This end state would further dictate that the remaining nuclear cores be separated from their warheads and delivery systems in a manner ensuring that they could not be mated within hours or days. . . ."

John P. Holdren, Ph.D, is Teresa and John Heinz Professor of Environmental Policy at the John F. Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University. He is chair of the Committee on International Security and Arms Control of the U.S. National Academy of Sciences. From 1987 to 1997 he was chair of the Executive Committee of the International Pugwash Council.

GETTING TO ZERO:
Is Pursuing a Nuclear-Weapon-Free World Too Difficult?
Too Dangerous? Too Distracting?
April 1998

This article is a longer version of a chapter for a book, Ending War: The Force of Reason (St. Martin's Press, 1999), honoring Sir Joseph Rotblat on his 90th birthday. Dr. Holdren's conclusion is presented below. The entire article is offered as a PDF document .

In this article Dr. Holdren considers how to achieve a nuclear-weapon-free world (NWFW). He has sections on:

• A Short History of Zero
  
• Shades of Zero: Meanings, Implications, Requirements
  
• Is Getting to Zero Too Difficult?
  
• Is Getting to Zero Too Dangerous?
  
• Is Getting to Zero Too Distracting?

He then offers his conclusion, as follows.

Conclusion

Let me use the conclusion of this essay to make completely clear my own positions on some of the key points at issue in the NWFW debate.

Benefits of Nuclear Disarmament

To begin, I agree with the conclusion of the 1997 National Academy of Sciences study (in the preparation of which I was much involved) that (1)

the potential benefits of comprehensive nuclear disarmament are so attractive relevant to the attendant risks - and the opportunities presented by the end of the Cold War and a range of other international trends are so compelling - that increased attention is now warranted to studying and fostering the conditions that would have to be met to make prohibition desirable and feasible.

I also find persuasive the argument in the National Academy study in favor of the term "prohibition" to describe what is being sought: it has the merit of being unambiguous, clearly achievable, and consistent with what has already been achieved in the cases of chemical and biological weapons; and it can be seen as a practical means toward the ideal end of "elimination" of nuclear weapons - an end which, as Calogero has pointed out , is worth pursuing even if it can only be approached "asymptotically".

Prohibition Is Desirable

I would go beyond what the National Academy group as a whole was willing to endorse, however, in arguing

• that the nuclear-weapon states should take the position already, today, that prohibition is clearly desirable under appropriate conditions,
  
• that the indefinite possession of nuclear weapons by any subset of states is clearly untenable, and
  
• that the nuclear-weapon states therefore commit themselves now to lead the way to achieving the conditions that will make prohibition feasible before another half century has passed.

Need for Timetable

I appreciate, but find ultimately unconvincing, the arguments that led the National Academy group, as well as the Canberra Commission and the Stimson Center Project on the Elimination of Weapons of Mass Destruction, to refrain from specifying a specific timetable. They are right to argue that the relevant variables are too many and the uncertainties too great to specify a timetable in detail. But an overall target is required to give meaning to the "unequivocal commitment" to elimination of nuclear weapons called for by the Canberra Commission (or the "serious commitment" called for by the Stimson Center group) and to give impetus to efforts to create the conditions that prohibition will require.

Any target will naturally be subject to revision - either more or less time might prove to be required - but there is at least a certain symmetry in the proposition that nuclear arsenals should be able to be built down in about the same amount of time that was used to build them up.

I proposed 2048 as the outer limit for getting to zero in a speech at the 150th anniversary conference of the American Association for the Advancement of Science in 1998 , where the theme was looking backwards and forwards fifty years. On the other hand, according to the Natural Resources Defense Council's tabulation - the best unclassified source - global nuclear stockpiles peaked in 1986 at 69,500, declining subsequently to about half that number in 1998; if the entire build-down took only as long the build-up, 41 years, the world would be back at zero by 2027.

There is merit, in any case, in the idea that the target for achieving a prohibition should be within the lifetimes of many people now living.

What to Include

In my opinion, the prohibition should include, at least,

• all intact nuclear weapons,
  
• all nuclear-weapon components, and
  
• all military stockpiles of directly bomb-usable nuclear-explosive materials.

I do not see need or benefit in allowing "virtual" nuclear arsenals consisting of weapon components that could be minutes from assembly, except as a form of de-alerting not to be confused with a NWFW. The virtual-arsenals approach fails to deliver the nonproliferation benefits of renunciation by the nuclear-weapon states of their special status, and it fails to relieve the core moral dilemma of nuclear deterrence in the form of choosing to prepare deliberately for the mass destruction of innocents as a means for avoiding it.

With respect to both these aspects, there is a crucial difference, between (a) the form of existential deterrence that would result from the ineradicability of nuclear-weapon knowledge (which is a state of deterrence arising from unavoidable circumstances) and (b) the virtual-arsenals idea (which is a form of the practice of deterrence). Knowledge-based existential deterrence is a permanent and universal condition associated with physical realities, requiring no conscious choices to maintain or exercise and not denied to some while allowed to others.

Interim Possession by an International Agency

I believe it would be preferable for nuclear weapons, weapon components, and military stockpiles of directly bomb-usable nuclear-explosive materials to be banned altogether - that is, not only prohibited from possession by states but also not retained by any international organization. But I would favor allowing possession by an international agency as an interim measure, if allowing this could bring about a prohibition on possession by states earlier than would otherwise be possible.

It is true that retention by an international organization would not represent as thoroughgoing a rejection of nuclear weapons and nuclear deterrence as a total ban would. But as a way-station toward the latter, it would already achieve the nonproliferation benefit of erasing the distinction between nuclear-weapon states and the rest. And it would take a great step toward the total delegitimization of nuclear weapons by making illegitimate their possession by states.

Civilian Nuclear Energy Systems

I think it is likely to be necessary, in order to get to and remain in a NWFW, that those aspects of civilian nuclear energy systems that lend themselves too readily to nuclear-weapons production be foregone or placed under international management.

The least problematic approach would probably be restricting reactors to once-through use of low-enriched uranium fuel, with the associated enrichment plants and spent-fuel storage facilities under international management.

If economically competitive long-term energy sources that avoid fissile materials altogether are not available before the resources of uranium that are economically usable in once-through fuel cycles are exhausted, making recycle of plutonium appear necessary, this should be done only in internationally managed, integrated nuclear-energy centers (with reactors and reprocessing and fuel-fabrication operations all at the same site), preferably using still-to-be-developed approaches in which the plutonium would never be completely separated from fission products.

Don't Wait for General and Complete Disarmament

I do not think that prohibition of nuclear weapons needs to await or be followed quickly by general and complete disarmament. Nuclear weapons are in a class by themselves in relation to indiscriminate, comprehensive, long-lasting destructiveness - the only weapons now known that could plausibly destroy all of civilization.

If chemical and biological weapons can be banned without waiting for general and complete disarmament - as they have been and deserved to be - then so can nuclear weapons.

Of course a world that has renounced armed conflict as a means of settling disputes would offer the ultimate security against the remobilization of any of these kinds of weapons. But even in the interim before this desideratum is achieved, the world will be better off banning nuclear weapons than continuing to permit them.

Compared to What?

This brings us back to the question of "Compared to what?" There are real difficulties on the road to a NWFW, and real dangers at the destination. But these are to be compared not to the perfection of a hypothetical hazard-free world, but rather to the risks and difficulties of continuing to live in a world from which nuclear weapons in the possession of states have not been banned and nuclear weapons in the possession of subnational groups cannot be ruled out.

Here, it must be emphasized, the proper comparison is not just with today's conditions - with the hazards of accidental, erroneous, unauthorized, or other use of nuclear weapons by any of five declared nuclear-weapon states and at least three undeclared ones - but also with the conditions likely to prevail in the future in the absence of decisive movement toward a NWFW.

For the world cannot simply stay where it is. In the absence of a credible commitment by the nuclear-weapon states to relinquish this special status on a timescale of practical interest, the number of nations choosing to acquire nuclear weapons for themselves is virtually certain to grow. Whether other factors affecting the probability of nuclear weapons use will improve rapidly enough to offset the adverse influence of a larger number of nuclear weapon states - and whether these improvements will apply everywhere that nuclear weapons appear - can be doubted.

Protection against Terrorists

While there are a few voices arguing that a world of more nuclear-weapon states will simply be a world of more robust and more comprehensive nuclear deterrence, moreover, no one can seriously argue that such deterrence will apply to the growing threat of nuclear bombs in the hands of terrorist and other criminal groups. That threat, which grows with the number of arsenals and bomb-material stockpiles from which criminals could obtain what they need, could well be the dominant nuclear threat in the next century. Not only is it greatly aggravated by the continued existence of national nuclear arsenals, but nuclear deterrence is likely to be useless against it because terrorists and other criminals may not be locatable, or if locatable could not responsibly be attacked with nuclear weapons. It is therefore another reason for believing a NWFW is preferable to the alternative.

Risk of Cheating and Breakout

Would cheating and breakout be possible in a NWFW? They can be made improbable, but not impossible.

Would the risks associated with these possibilities - that is, the consequences weighted by the probabilities - be greater than the nuclear risks the world faces today or is likely to face in the future without a NWFW? It does not seem so to me, for reasons adduced in the "dangers" section, above, reinforced by a degree of optimism about potentially helpful technological changes: the evolution of monitoring capabilities (including internet-assisted "societal verification") to improve the capacity to detect cheating or plans for breakout before they come to fruition; and the evolution of conventional-force capabilities to improve the capacity to knock out rogue nuclear capabilities before they can be used (or, at worst, before they can be used more than once).

If these capabilities are seen as insufficient in the context of the other incentives and barriers to nuclear weapons acquisition, keeping a small nuclear arsenal under international control as an interim step on the way to a true NWFW should be preferable by far to the hazards of a world with multiple nuclear arsenals in the hands of states.

Future Prospects

To those who say that it is "unimaginable" that verification of a NWFW could be good enough, or that sovereign states will ever voluntarily surrender control over nuclear weapons and nuclear-fuel-cycle facilities, I say these are failures of imagination. The rates of change in technology, in politics, and in international arrangements have been rapid in recent decades, and no one is smart enough to be able to confidently place limits on what may be achieved in a few decades more.

It is entirely possible, in fact, that another decade or so of cuts in the US and Russian nuclear arsenals, de-alerting of the forces that remain, improved protection of nuclear-explosive materials, a comprehensive cut-off of military production of these, and increased transparency and monitoring to go with it all will put in place a substantial part of the technical, institutional, and political ingredients that would be needed for a NWFW.

Let us find out.

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(1) Committee on International Security and Arms Control (William F. Burns, Study Chair; John P. Holdren, Committee Chair; Jo L. Husbands, Staff Director; and 14 others), The Future of U.S. Nuclear Weapons Policy, National Academy Press, Washington, DC, 1997.

(2) Francesco Calogero, "An Asymptotic Approach to a NWFW", Chapter 13 in Joseph Rotblat, Jack Steinberger, and Bhalchandra Udgaonkar, eds, A Nuclear Weapons Free World: Desirable? Feasible?, Westview, Boulder, 1993. pp. 191-200.

(3) John P. Holdren, "Thoughts on Science, Technology, and Human Well-Being in the Next 50 Years", APS News, vol. 7, no. 4, April 1998, p 12.

(4) NRDC, "Table of Global Nuclear Stockpiles, 1945-1996", available on the NRDC website at http://www.nrdc.org/nrdcpro/nudb/datab19.html

In November 2002 the Middle Powers Initiative published a Consultation Report on Priorities for Preserving the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty in the New Strategic Context. The recommendations lay out an agenda for next steps toward zero nuclear weapons.

Priorities for Preserving the Nuclear Non-Proliferation
Treaty in the New Strategic Concept
November 2002

Recommendations

The Middle Powers Initiative urges governments to work together to obtain the following priority results in fulfillment of the nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation obligations under the NPT, outlined in the 13 Steps document of 2000:

1. Strategic Nuclear Arms Reductions: Implementation of the May 2002 U.S.-Russian Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty (Moscow Treaty) in accordance with NPT principles so that downloaded warheads and their delivery systems are irreversibly dismantled in a transparent and verifiable manner; dealerting the remaining deployed U.S. and Russian nuclear forces in accordance with the NPT commitment to further reduce the operational status of nuclear weapons systems.

2. Tactical Nuclear Arms Reductions: Unilateral removal by the United States of its remaining tactical nuclear bombs deployed under NATO auspices in Europe; creation of a wider process and control of U.S. and Russian tactical weapons through
a) reporting on the 1991-1992 Presidential initiatives;
b) formalizing these initiatives by establishing a verification mechanism;
c) reciprocally exchanging information - in accordance with existing NATO proposals - regarding readiness, safety, and sub-strategic forces; and
d) commencing U.S.-Russian negotiations on reducing non-strategic nuclear weapons.

3. Non-Use of Nuclear Weapons: Reversal of trends toward expansion of options for use of nuclear weapons, including against non-nuclear weapon countries, as exemplified in the Russian National Security Concept of January 2000 or the U.S. Nuclear Posture Review of January 2002 and the U.S. WMD Strategy of December 2002; establishment of an absolute refusal of middle power countries in any multilateral or bilateral security alliances to participate in or support the first use of nuclear weapons or to prepare for such use.