|
|
|
|
|
On December 5, 1996 there was worldwide
release of a Statement
by International Generals and Admirals
calling for the irrevocable elimination
of nuclear weapons. Initiated by the late
Senator Alan Cranston of the Global
Security Institute, the statement was
signed by 60 military leaders from around
the globe, including from the United States,
Russia,6 United Kingdom, France, Canada,
Denmark, Ghana, Greece, India, Japan, Jordan,
Netherlands, Norway, Pakistan, Portugal,
Sri Lanka, and Tanzania. They stated:
| It is our deep conviction
that the following is urgently needed
and must be undertaken now. |
- First, present and planned stockpiles
of nuclear weapons are exceedingly
large and should now be greatly
cut back;
- Second, remaining nuclear weapons
should be gradually and transparently
taken off alert, and their readiness
substantially reduced both in nuclear
weapon states and in de facto nuclear
weapon states;
- Third, long-term international
nuclear policy must be based on
the declared principle of continuous,
complete and irrevocable elimination
of nuclear weapons.
|
| Their closing words were: |
- We have been presented with a
challenge of the highest possible
historic importance: the creation
of a nuclear-weapons-free world.
The end of the Cold War makes it
possible.
- The dangers of proliferation,
terrorism, and a new nuclear arms
race render it necessary. We must
not fail to seize our opportunity.
|
|
|
|
|
A graduate of the U. S. Air Force Academy, General
Lee Butler, U.S. Air Force (ret.), served in Vietnam,
commanded a heavy bomber wing, and filled a variety
positions at the Pentagon. In 1991 he became the
Commander-in-Chief of the Strategic Air Command
and its successor agency, the U.S. Strategic Command
until his retirement in 1994.
After his retirement General Butler served
as member of the Canberra Commission on the Elimination
of Nuclear Weapons. His first public expression
of his views on this issue occurred in October
1996 in an Address to the State
of the World Forum.
Two months later he addressed a national broadcast
audience in Remarks at the National Press Club
[linkage to be added]. On this occasion he spoke
of the rapid changes taking place since the end
of the Cold War and his reflections of what was
occurring. In his remarks he indicated
| Most importantly, I could see for the first
time the prospect of restoring a world free
of the apocalyptic threat of nuclear weapons.
Over time, the shimmering hope gave way to
judgment which has now become a deeply held
conviction: that a world free of the threat
of nuclear weapons is necessarily a world
devoid of nuclear weapons. |
General Butler elaborated on his concerns which
compelled this conviction.
- First, a growing alarm that despite
all evidence, we have yet to fully grasp
the monstrous effects of these weapons,
that the consequences of their use defy
reason, transcending time and space, poisoning
the earth and deforming its inhabitants.
- Second, a deepening dismay at the prolongation
of Cold War policies and practices in
a world where our security interests have
been utterly transformed.
- Third, that foremost among these policies,
deterrence reigns unchallenged, with its
embedded assumption of hostility and associated
preference for forces on high states of
alert.
- Fourth, an acute unease over renewed
assertions of the utility of nuclear weapons,
especially as regards response to chemical
or biological attack.
- Fifth, grave doubt that the present
highly discriminatory regime of nuclear
and non-nuclear states can long endure
absent a credible commitment by the nuclear
powers to eliminate their nuclear arsenals.
- And finally, the horrific prospect of
a world seething with enmities, armed
to the teeth with nuclear weapons, and
hostage to maniacal leaders strongly disposed
toward their use.
|
General Butler noted that "the world has
begun to recoil from the nuclear abyss."
He indicated that a choice must be made:
| There is a much larger issue which now confronts
the nuclear powers and engages the vital interest
of every nation: whether the world is better
served by a prolonged era of cautious nuclear
weapons reductions toward some intermediate
endpoint; or by an unequivocal commitment
on the part of the nuclear powers to move
with much greater urgency toward the goal
of eliminating these arsenals in their entirety. |
General Butler chose the latter course. His
National Press Club Remarks occurred upon the
occasion of the release of the joint statement
with General Goodpaster and the Statement of International
Generals and Admirals. General Butler said that
he had decided
| to join my voice with respected colleagues
such as General Goodpaster to urge publicly
that the United States make unequivocal its
commitment to the elimination of nuclear arsenals,
and take the lead in setting an agenda for
moving forthrightly toward that objective. |
In subsequent months General Butler continued
to speak out on the need to eliminate nuclear
weapons. He returned to the National Press Club
on February 2, 1998 and gave a speech on The
Risks of Nuclear Deterrence: From Superpowers
to Rogue Leaders. Among other matters he dealt
with the legitimacy of nuclear retaliation.
| What better illustration of
misplaced faith in nuclear deterrence than
the persistent belief that retaliation with
nuclear weapons is a legitimate and appropriate
response to post-cold war threats posed by
weapons of mass destruction. What could possibly
justify our resort to the very means we properly
abhor and condemn? Who can imagine our joining
in shattering the precedent of non-use that
has held for over fifty years? How could America's
irreplaceable role as leader of the campaign
against nuclear proliferation ever be re-justified?
What target would warrant such retaliation?
Would we hold an entire society accountable
for the decision of a single demented leader?
How would the physical effects of the nuclear
explosion be contained, not to mention the
political and moral consequences? In a singular
act we would martyr our enemy, alienate
our friends, give comfort to the non-declared
nuclear states and impetus to states who
seek such weapons covertly.
In short, such a response on the part of
the United States is inconceivable. It would
irretrievably diminish our priceless stature
as a nation noble in aspiration and responsible
in conduct, even in the face of extreme
provocation.
|
In a speech given at the John Fitzgerald
Kennedy Library in Boston on November 22, 1998,
General Butler offered a set of judgments on nuclear
weapons and nuclear war, including the following:
- Nuclear weapons are not weapons at all.
They are insanely destructive agents of
physical and genetic terror, whose effects
transcend time and space, poisoning the
earth and deforming its inhabitants for
generation upon generation.
- The stakes of nuclear war engage not
just the survival of the antagonists but
the fate of mankind.
- The prospect of shearing away entire
societies has no military nor political
justification.
|
|
|
 Rear
Admiral Eugene J. Carroll, Jr. (USN ret.) was
commissioned an ensign in 1945 just before the
end the end of World War II. He served with combat
units engaged in the Korean and Vietnam Wars.
Promoted to rear admiral in 1972, he served as
commander of Task Force 60, the carrier striking
force of the U.S. Sixth Fleet in the Mediterranean.
His last assignment on active duty was at the
Pentagon engaged in U.S. naval planning for conventional
and nuclear war. Upon his retirement from the
Navy, he worked many years for the Center for
Defense Information, serving as deputy director.
In an address to the Olaf
Palme Institute in Stockholm, Sweden in May
1998, Admiral told of his personal involvement
with nuclear weapons and offered his conclusions
about their utility. He said:
| First, let me
tell you why I am here to advocate the abolition
of nuclear weapons. I have been personally
involved with these engines of destruction
since the beginning of the nuclear era. 42
years ago I was a pilot prepared to destroy
a European target with a bomb that would have
killed 600,000 people. 20 years ago, as the
Director of U.S. Military Operations in Europe,
I was the officer responsible for the security,
readiness and employment of 7,000 nuclear
weapons against Warsaw Pact forces in Europe
and Russia, weapons which could never defend
anything - only destroy everything.
My knowledge of nuclear weapons has convinced
me that they can never be used for any rational
military or political purpose. Their use
would only create barbaric, indiscriminate
destruction.
|
In his speech Admiral Carroll outlined a series
of steps that could lead to the ultimate elimination
of nuclear weapons. These steps include:
- Unqualified non-first use guarantees
for both strategic and tactical nuclear
weapons.
- START III negotiations for deep reductions
by the United States and Russia.
- Take thousands of nuclear warheads off
of alert status.
- Verification measures with international
participation.
- Disassembly of warheads under international
supervision.
- Great Britain, France, China, and de
facto nuclear states, including Israel,
should join the process.
- An international convention should be
adopted to prohibit the manufacture, possession
or use of nuclear explosive devices.
|
Admiral Carroll has spoken widely for the
elimination of nuclear weapons. He dealt with
this subject in "America's Future" Confrontation
or Cooperation?", an address to the World
Federalist Association in November 1998. He stated:
| Empires rise and fall. Alliances wax and
wane. Wars erupt and subside -- with few long
term changes or benefits. In attempting to
perpetuate a concept of foreign relations
based on military power, the United States
is wasting a priceless opportunity to move
from a confrontational posture to a cooperative
one.
Jonathan Schell's latest book, "The
Gift of Time," focuses on the need
to get rid of nuclear weapons while there
is no active threat to American security
except nuclear weapons. By extension, we
can use the gift of time to build a new,
long term approach to security in the 21st
Century.
On that point, let me draw an analogy between
the need to get rid of all nuclear weapons
and the need to achieve a cooperative world
community of nations living together in
peace and governed under the rule of law.
The first similarity is that no one, no
individual or group, is wise enough today
to say how or when we can actually achieve
either goal. It is impossible today to foresee
or prescribe all the conditions which must
exist before nuclear weapons are abolished;
or, a system of global governance established.
Today the realities are that the most powerful
nation on earth declares that nuclear weapons
are the cornerstone of our security and
the same nation refuses to surrender the
smallest scintilla of national sovereignty
in the conduct of international relations.
How do ideals triumph over such realities?
My answer is the same for both efforts.
One step at a time.
|
|
With respect to nuclear abolition
|
- we begin by working for ratification
of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty;
- we work for the universal declaration
of a no first-use policy;
- we work for the de-alerting of strategic
weapons;
- we work for separation of warheads from
delivery vehicles;
- we work for significant reductions in
nuclear arsenals until 37,000 weapons
become 5,000 and then 1,000 and then 500.
|
Then we hope that those who follow us will
be wise enough to work out the means of eliminating
the last nuclear weapons on earth.
Can we be certain of success? No, but we can
be certain that as we proceed the world will become
progressively safer each step of the way. As the
danger of nuclear catastrophe fades, each successive
step will become more obvious and more beneficial
until the rewards of abolition are irresistible
and inevitable.
|
Admiral Noel Gayler, U.S. Navy (ret.) served
during World War II as a carrier fighter pilot.
His subsequent sea commands included fighter and
experimental squadrons, and carriers. From 1972
until his retirement as a four-star admiral he
was Commander-in-Chief of all U.S. forces in the
Pacific. In 1984 Admiral Gayler offered "A
Commander-in-Chief's Perspective on Nuclear Weapons"
in The Nuclear Crisis Reader (Gwyn Prins, editor;
New York, Vintage Books, 1984, pp. 16-18).
Let me begin by stating my main proposition
plainly, so that there may be no misunderstanding.
It is my view that there is no sensible military
use for nuclear weapons, whether "strategic"
weapons, "tactical" weapons, "theater"
weapons, weapons at sea or weapons in space.
. . .
Taking the Pacific first, when I was Commander-in-Chief
(Pacific) I could not find, in scrutinizing
the whole of the Pacific command, any area where
it would conceivably have made sense to explode
nuclear weapons in order to carry our military
objectives. Clearly our experience in the Vietnam
War suggests that we would not do such a thing.
We did not do even "conventional"
things which were well within our capability
because of understandable political and humane
considerations.
Nor could I see a case for nuclear weapons
anywhere else on the Asian continent. For example,
the Korean Demilitarized Zone is one flashpoint
that comes immediately to mind. My evaluation,
together with that of senior generals, both
Korean and American, responsible for the defense
of the Demilitarized Zone and of the city of
Seoul and its approach and environs, was that
it simply was not necessary to contemplate a
nuclear strategy. The potential channels of
attack on Seoul are highly concentrated, the
defenses are well in place, and Seoul itself
is protected by a river in front of it. . .
.
Furthermore, with respect to the Asian continent
as a whole, we have to face the fact that there
is a political consideration of overwhelming
importance. The only use of nuclear weapons
has been against an Asiatic people. . . .[It]
is my belief that the use of a nuclear weapon
against any Asian people, for any purpose whatsoever,
would polarize Asia against us. It would clearly
not be worth the candle. For all these reasons
I saw no need for nuclear weapons in the Pacific
theater, and I so stated.
Another potential theater, of course, is maritime
Russia: the Soviet naval forces dispersed through
the Pacific area, their bases, lines of transit,
choke points. All I would say about that is
that, while it is an important place, it is
less important than the entire problem that
would be involved if you were actually to fight
Russia. . . .
In the Middle East, there have been various
scenarios proposed, including the initiative
use of nuclear weapons to block certain passes
down into Iran and so forth. Pacific Command
did a considerable study of that potentiality
and came to the conclusion that we were so outgunned
by the Soviets in nuclear delivery capabilities
and in respect to the small number of highly
critical targets we owned, compared with the
very large number of less critical targets that
they had, that it was not something that we
should open up, on strictly military grounds.
I am now going to turn. . . .to NATO. I have
seen some pretty persuasive studies which support
my own conclusions that we could not possibly
gain an advantage by the initiative use (first
use) of nuclear weapons to defend Europe against
a conventional attack.
The first consideration is that, were we to
use them except as a demonstration, we would
have to use them in the number of tens and low
hundreds. Attack on this scale would be required
to stop, say, four nominal tank breakthroughs
(a common assumption). The number of noncombatants
killed would be very high. I have seen competent
estimates which suggest that a median number
killed might be a million people. . . .
The danger of escalation after the first use
of nuclear weapons I regard as being extremely
high . . .
Finally it does not appear that relative advantage
would accrue to NATO from a nuclear first use,
because of the fact that we have a far more
vulnerable target system, smaller numbers of
highly critical targets like harbors, depots
and airfields, and that the Soviets have a capability
to attack these sorts of targets with nuclear
weapons at least comparable to ours. . . .
The problem of authorizing use is very severe.
I personally do not believe that a President
of the United States would be likely to release
tactical nuclear weapons to stop a conventional
attack. It think he would see, and his advisers
would tell him, that the risk of total destruction
of Europe and the total destruction of the United
States would be too high. So no commander would
count on these weapons when push came to shove.
. . .
In The Nuclear Crisis Reader Admiral Gayler
contributed a second article, "The Way Out:
A General Nuclear Settlement" (pp. 234-243).
Writing in 1984 when the Soviet Union and the
United States were engaged in intense nuclear
rivalry, he presented six elements of a general
nuclear settlement:
- Make an end to the intemperate, childish
and threaten rhetoric between us.
- Give up nuclear war-fighting doctrines.
The three most dangerous doctrines are:
- First use against conventional
force.
- Counterforce, sometimes called
"prompt hard target kill".
- Protracted or "winnable"
nuclear war. There can be no
winners
|
- Improve communications of every kind.
- A mutual moratorium on the further development,
testing and deployment of new nuclear
weapons.
- Avoid the extension of nuclear war capability
in to new areas, whether technical or
spatial (that is, exporting war to space).
- We and the Soviets need to make deep,
fast and continuing cuts in the number
of nuclear weapons of all kinds.
|
In this article Admiral Gayler advocated a
scheme for weapons conversion whereby:
| Each country hands over progressively larger
numbers of explosive nuclear fission devices
to a single conversion facility, built explicitly
for this purpose, at a neutral site.
|
Admiral Gayler returned to this subject in
recent years in A
Proposal for Achieving Zero Nuclear Weapons,
posted on the web site of the Nuclear Age Peace
Foundation. He wrote:
| Process, as opposed to negotiating
numbers, is the basic principle of the proposal
that I suggest. It is nothing less than drastic:
the continuing reduction to zero of weapons
in the hands of avowed nuclear powers, plus
an end to the nuclear ambitions of others.
The proposal: Let weapons be delivered
to a single point, there to be dismantled,
the nuclear material returned to the donors
for use or disposal, and the weapons destroyed.
This process, once underway, will be nearly
impossible to stop, since its obvious merits,
political and substantive, will compel support.
The "single point" may well be
a floating platform, at sea, in international
waters. A handy platform can be an aircraft
carrier that has been removed from "mothballs"
and disarmed, yet capable of steaming to
the desired location and operating support
aircraft and ships to handle heavier loads.
|
Admiral Gayler in this article dispels come
common illusions about nuclear weapons:
- Is physical defense against nuclear
weapons possible? No. What's more,
it's irrelevant. A half dozen non-technical
means of delivery avail.
- Can nuclear weapons be used in any
sensible manner? No. This includes
"tactical."
- Does nuclear disarmament imperil
our security? No. It enhances it.
- Is deterrence of nuclear or other
attack by threat of retaliation still
possible? No. The many potential aggressors
are scattered - even location unknown.
No targets!
|
|
|
 A
graduate from the U.S. Military Academy, General
Andrew J. Goodpaster commanded a combat battalion
in North Africa and Italy during World War II.
He was staff secretary to President Eisenhower
from 1954 to 1961. He served as Supreme Allied
Commander in Europe (1969-1974). After retirement
he was recalled to active duty as superintendent
of the U.S. Military Academy. General Goodpaster
served as chairman of the Atlantic Council of
the United States from 1985 to1997 and now chairs
its project on nuclear arms control.
At the release of the Statement
by International Generals and Admirals in
December1996, General Goodpaster offered opening
remarks. Among other things he said:
I welcome the opportunity to talk with you
about the reduction of the world's nuclear weapons
arsenals. It is an issue that ranks in the highest
order of importance for American security (and
that of others) in the coming century. . . .
Two considerations fundamental to security
interests and possibilities should now shape
the nuclear future.
First, as so often emphasized by President
Eisenhower (who had a talent for getting to
the heart of such questions) nuclear weapons
are the only thing that can destroy the United
States of America.
Second, the Cold War is over and unlikely to
return, hard as it may be to comprehend this
historic fact in all its dimensions, and to
seize the opportunities that are now available
to reorient our policies accordingly.
Nowhere is this more salient than in reducing
the world's arsenals of nuclear weapons.
To put his concerns into action General Goodpaster
since1991 has chaired the Nuclear Arms Control Project
of the Atlantic Council of the United States. In
this capacity he wrote three policy papers, which
are reviewed in the Deep Cuts section [linkage to
be added] in the How to Get to Zero page. He was
also chair of a study group of the Stimson Center
that produced a report on Evolving U.S. Nuclear
Policy. [linkage to be added] In these efforts he
developed ideas on stages of nuclear arms reduction.
|
[photo] In his twenty years of service in
the Royal Navy, Commander Robert Green (ret.)
from New Zealand flew nuclear-armed aircraft for
nine years and then served in the intelligence
service. During his navy career he became disillusioned
with nuclear deterrence. Becoming a strong advocate
of nuclear abolition in his retirement, he presented
his views in The Naked Nuclear Emperor: Debunking
Nuclear Deterrence (2000, The Disarmament and
Security Center, P.O. Box 8390, Christchurch,
New Zealand).
Commander Green summarized his thinking in
an article entitled Why
Nuclear Deterrence is a Dangerous Illusion,
posted by the Nuclear Age Peace Foundation. Highlights
are as follows:
- What is at stake from deterrence failing
between nuclear weapon states is the devastation
and poisoning of not just the belligerent
powers, but potentially of all forms of
life on the planet.
- Meanwhile, retention of nuclear arsenals
encourages proliferation of the problem,
and with it this unacceptable risk.
- The Bomb directly threatens security
-- both of those who possess it and those
it is meant to impress. Indeed, it is
a security problem, not a solution. This
is because it provokes the greatest threat:
namely, the spread of nuclear weapons
to megalomaniac leaders and terrorist
-- who are least likely to be deterred.
|
|
 In
his Air Force career General Charles Horner served
two tours of duty as a combat pilot in Vietnam.
In 1991, he was Allied Air Forces Commander in
Gulf War, and from 1992 to 1994 he served as Commander
of the U.S. Space Command. On July 15, 1994, just
prior to retirement from the U.S. Air Force, General
Horner offered his views on the utility of nuclear
weapons at a breakfast meeting of the Defense
Writers' Group. As reported in a variety of newspaper
accounts, he said the following:
- The nuclear weapon is obsolete. I want
to get rid of them all.
- I want to go to zero, and I'll tell
you why: If we and the Russians can go
to zero nuclear weapons, then think what
that does for us in our efforts to counter
the new war.
- The new military threat, unlike the
superpower tensions of the past, comes
from smaller, less stable countries that
obtain weapons of mass destruction.
- Think how intolerant we will be of
nations that are developing nuclear weapons
if we have none. Think of the high moral
ground we secure by having none...It's
kind of hard for us to say to North Korea,
`You are terrible people, you're developing
a nuclear weapons,' when we have oh, 8,000.
- I'm not saying that we militarily disarm.
I'm saying that I have a nuclear weapon,
and you're North Korea and you have a
nuclear weapon. You can use yours. I can't
use mine. What am I going to use it on?
What are nuclear weapons good for? Busting
cities. What president of the United States
is going to take out Pyongyang?
- So then, you say, `Why do I have nuclear
weapons?' To use against small countries
creating problems. But then you get into
that moral issue...I just don't think
nuclear weapons are usable.
|
General Horner was one of 18 military leaders
who joined 21 religious leaders in signing the
Joint Statement on Nuclear Reduction/Disarmament
in June 2000. In his own statement
on that occasion he said, among other things:
- The Cold War is over. The United States
and Russia no longer require the strategy
of nuclear deterrence. Yet the world remains
a dangerous place.
- The Statement...addresses the fact that
nuclear deterrence increasingly lacks
credibility, and if these weapons are
retained for such purposes, it may only
legitimize their use. It is hopeful, but
not overly optimistic, as it calls for
reciprocal and phased reductions that
may require many years. It is a challenge,
for while the banning of nuclear weapons
is not the sole responsibility of the
United States, we are in a position to
lead the effort.
|
|
General Colin Powell, U.S. Army (ret.) entered
the Army through the ROTC. He had two tours of
duty in Vietnam and served as a battalion commander
in Korea. He held a succession of military and
civilian positions, culminating as National Security
Adviser to President Reagan. In 1989 President
George H.W. Bush appointed him Chairman of the
Joint Chiefs of Staff, a position he held until
the fall of 1993 under President Clinton. He now
serves as Secretary of State under President George
W. Bush.
In a commencement address at Harvard University
on June 10, 1993 General Powell spoke on the future
of nuclear weapons.
| Today -- on what happens to be the 30th
anniversary of the talks that led to the Limited
Test Ban Treaty -- I declare my hope and declare
it from the bottom of my heart that we will
eventually see the time when the number of
nuclear weapons is down to zero and the world
is a much better place. |
Three months later General Powell articulated
his views on the utility of nuclear weapons in
a breakfast meeting with the Defense Writers'
Group, held on September 23, 1993.
- With respect to nuclear weapons, I think
their principal purpose remains deterrence
against a major nuclear attack against
the United States, however remote that
might be, and thank God it's becoming
more and more and more remote.
- The second part of that, though, has
to do with the fact that there are a number
of nations in the Third World who think
that they will gain some political or
military utility through the possession
of nuclear weapons. Every time I get a
chance to talk to them, I try to dissuade
them of that. And I make the point that
I think that it's a wasted investment
in a military capability that is limited
in political or military utility, and
that we have ways of responding and punishing
conventionally that you would not wish
to see us use. And at the end of the day,
we have far more nuclear weapons than
you do, so what's the utility that you
get out of this?
- I have not been faced with a military
situation in the several conflicts we've
been involved in over the last four years
where I thought there was going to be
a need to resort to such weapons, and
I'm glad that turned out to be the case.
We've had two wars [in Panama and the
Persian Gulf], six rescues and 22 other
major events in the last four years for
these reluctant warriors in the Pentagon.
|
In 2001 General Colin Powell, now retired
from the U.S. Army, became secretary of state
in the administration of President George W. Bush.
He discussed the prospects for use of nuclear
weapons in an interview on the News Hour with
Jim Lehrer on May 30, 2002. The focus was the
threat of war between India and Pakistan. Lehrer
asked him, " If there is, in fact, a conflict,
how likely is it that it would eventually lead
to the use of nuclear weapons by these two countries?"
Powell replied:
I can't answer that question, but I can
say this: In my conversations with both sides,
especially with the Pakistani side, I have
made it clear that this really can't be in
anyone's mind. I mean, the thought of nuclear
conflict in the year 2002 -- with what that
would mean with respect to loss of life, what
that would mean with respect to the condemnation,
the worldwide condemnation that would come
down on whatever
nation chose to take that course of action
-- would be such that I can see very little
military, political, or any other kind of
justification for the use of nuclear weapons.
Nuclear weapons in this day and age may
serve some deterrent effect, and so be it,
but to think of using them as just another
weapon in what might start out as a conventional
conflict in this day and age, seems to me
to be something that no side should be contemplating.
|
|
 After
serving as Commander of a carrier task group of
the Sixth Fleet in the Mediterranean (1970-71),
Commander of the Second Fleet in the Atlantic
(1974-75), and Commander-in-Chief of Allied Forces
in Southern Europe, NATO (1975), Admiral Stansfield
Turner, USN (ret.) was Director of Central Intelligence
(1977-81).
In 1997 Admiral Turner offered his ideas on
nuclear weapons in a book entitled Caging the
Nuclear Genie: An American Challenge for Global
Security (Westview Press). He wrote that it is
time to move away from the Cold War policy of
"sitting on hair trigger alert with thousands
of nuclear warheads" (p.99). As an alternative
(p. 102), he offered a new vision based on
- Strategic escrow
- Treaty of No First-Use supplemented
with sanctions
- Modest defenses
|
Admiral Turner explained his idea of strategic
escrow in a 1999 interview
recorded by the Center for Defense Information.
| It's a process I call strategic
escrow. It's a form of de-alerting both the
Russian and American nuclear forces. You take
a thousand warheads off of missiles in the
United States today and you move them maybe
300 miles away, so they can't just go back
overnight. You ask the Russians to put observers
on that storage site where you've put the
thousand warheads. They can count what went
in, they can count if anything went out.
You don't need detailed verification procedures
that take years to negotiate in a treaty.
What you hope is the Russians then take
a thousand off and put our observers on
them. A lot of people think they will not,
but I say they have to. It's the only quick
way to avoid their having one-fourth to
one-sixth the number of warheads on line
that we have maybe eight or ten years from
now, because of the decline inexorably of
the size of their force due to the lack
of maintenance.
So then we have a process going. We do
another thousand, they do another thousand.
I mean from today's numbers, we can be down
into hundreds in a matter of, in my opinion,
four or five years if we do this. And the
most urgent thing for the United States
today is to get the Russian nuclear arsenal
off alert, get it down to as few of these
as possible.
And my ultimate objective is to get every
nuclear warhead in the world in escrow so
nobody can pull the trigger today, but if
somebody cheats, like Saddam Hussein, and
decides to threaten the world because he's
got the nuclear weapons that he shouldn't,
then you still have the warheads in escrow
and you can bring them back and say, "Saddam,
you've got ten, but we just have recombined
a hundred, and therefore you have no advantage.
In fact, you're very vulnerable if you decide
to continue threatening or using nuclear
weapons."
|
When Admiral Turner joined military and religious
leaders in the release of the Joint
Statement on Nuclear Reductions/Disarmament
at the Washington National Cathedral in June 2000,
he said in his own statement:
- We must go downward much more rapidly
than we are if we are going to prevent
the further proliferation of these weapons
to other states as we've recently had
proliferation to Pakistan and India.
- As long as the two nuclear superpowers
maintain arsenals in the tens of thousands
of nuclear warheads, there is no way they
can with any consistency urge that other
nations not be allowed to acquire these
weapons.
|
|
 John
J. Shanahan enlisted in the U.S. Navy prior to the
outbreak of World War II and retired in 1977 as
a vice admiral. He was involved in World War II,
the Korean War, and the Vietnam War. He commanded
the U.S. Second Fleet in the Atlantic. His shore
assignments included staff member for the Joint
Chiefs of Staff and director of strategic plans
and policy in the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations.
After his retirement Admiral Shanahan remained
active in national security issues. For a number
of years he was Director of the Center for Defense
Information.
In March 1997 Admiral Shanahan presented Remarks
to the Olof Palme International Center
in Stockholm, Sweden on the subject of nuclear
abolition. He recalled his involvement as a junior
officer in nuclear tests in the Pacific in 1948
and 1949. He indicated:
| I knew then, but
didn't realize it, what I know now, that nuclear
weapons have no place in the weapons inventories
of any nation and there must be an organized
serious international effort to rid the world
of this weapon of mass destruction....
The goal must be the eventual elimination
of nuclear weapons with near- and mid-term
reductions in all nuclear stockpiles.
|
In his remarks Admiral Shanahan mentioned
several unilateral steps that the United States
could take to jumpstart the process. They included:
- Remove the warheads from all missiles
and bombers to be eliminated under the
START II Treaty.
- Make U.S. command and control more transparent
so as to improve confidence that the United
States truly does not target Russia or
any non-nuclear weapon state that is a
signatory of the NPT Treaty.
- Bring home the more than 400 U.S. Air
Force tactical bombs currently deployed
in Europe and cancel the subcritical nuclear
tests that the Department of Energy plans
to conduct at the Nevada Test Site.
|
Admiral Shanahan also recommended multilateral
efforts, including:
- Separating warheads from delivery systems;
- Placing those warheads and missiles
into safe, internationally-monitored storage;
- Dismantling all tactical nuclear weapons;
- Eliminating the thousands of strategic
warheads that the United States and Russia
plan to maintain in storage indefinitely;
- Cutting further the deployed strategic
arsenals of all five declared nuclear
weapons states;
- Banning the production of highly-enriched
uranium and plutonium for any purpose;
- Enforcing strict controls on all fissile
materials worldwide.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| |
All
contents © 2002 Zero-Nukes.org
|
|
|
|
|
